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ON THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY OWNERSHIP 
AMONG FORMER SLAVES, NEWLY FREEDMEN 
 
(ACCEPTED BY THE JOURNAL OF LAW, PROPERTY AND SOCIETY 
FOR PUBLICATION) 
 
ELEANOR MARIE LAWRENCE BROWN 
Abstract 
 
 
One might think of the slave property system of provision grounds (or 
“provisioning”) in the West Indies as a happy coalition of interests 
between planters (who wanted to provide slaves incentives to feed 
themselves), Westminster (who wanted well-fed slaves to ensure the 
productivity of the sugar sector, a hefty tax contributor to the 
Exchequer), and slaves (who saw the advantages of a system which 
ensured that they were fed and encouraged private enterprise). Yet 
while this was generally true, notably, not all members of the 
plantocracy viewed these developments as positive.  An outspoken 
minority feared that the roots of the ultimate failure of plantation 
society would lie in the slave provisioning system. Moreover, they 
pointed to the resistance of the plantocracy in the U.S. South to private 
enterprise among slaves as the preferable course. The views of this 
outspoken minority ultimately proved prescient, as a struggle over 
true ownership of provisioning plots played out against the backdrop 
of Emancipation in the British colonies.  
 
I focus on the era immediately after British Emancipation. During 
slavery planters were willing to grant slaves provisioning plots 
because the planters themselves exacted a benefit from doing so; they 
essentially “outsourced” the job of feeding the slaves to the slaves 
themselves. Once labor became free, this benefit vanished. Planters 
began to wonder how to handle ex-slaves farming provision grounds. 
Although provision grounds were de facto (perceived to be) slave 
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property, typically these lands were instead de jure planter property 
(plots at the edge of the plantations for which the planters held title).   
 
The issue became particularly acute in the aftermath of Emancipation, 
when planters sought to “tie” former-slaves-turned-freedmen to the 
plantations to secure a reliable workforce. Newly freed, the former 
slaves had no obligation to accept planters’ “offers” of employment 
on the plantations.  
 
Property acquisition during slavery (when there were no formal 
protections) turned out to be singularly important in determining who 
continued to remain in the employ of the plantation post-
Emancipation. The irony is that the extensive nature of the 
provisioning system (which acculturated slaves to a form of 
“property-and-contract-lite”) made it less likely that ex-slaves 
continued to remain in the employ of the planters once leaving became 
a viable choice. West Indian freedmen who already had a taste of 
property ownership were typically not enamored with long-term 
plantation employment. 
Following this logic, one might predict that planters in the U.S. South 
would ultimately prove more successful in maintaining a long-term 
plantation-like society (even after the abolition of slavery) than their 
West Indian counterparts because they never allowed provisioning to 
develop. This prediction is spot-on. In particular, the early demise of 
status relationships that undergirded plantation society in the West 
Indies had much to do with the general failure of share tenancy (and 
its most popular iteration, sharecropping) in the West Indies.  
In a system of sharecropping, a landowner allows a tenant to use the 
land in return for a share of the crops produced on the land. This 
significantly reduces the strain that up-front labor costs place on a 
plantation’s cash-flow. Although now most widely associated in the 
popular American imagination with the U.S. South, sharecropping has 
a long historical heritage that pre-dates Southern plantation society. 
Sharecropping was attractive to the West Indian planter for the same 
reason that it was attractive to the Southern planter – primarily as a 
mechanism of tying slaves to the plantations while saving on labor 
costs.  
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In summary, both planters in the West Indies and the U.S. South sought 
to institutionalize sharecropping arrangements. But it is largely 
because of the provisioning system that West Indian planters fail in 
their efforts, while Southern planters succeed. West Indian slaves 
opted instead in large numbers to use the money that they had 
accumulated from contracting at food markets during slavery to buy 
their own land and become de jure property owners. 
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I. THE WEALTH GAP 
 
Why is African-American net worth so low? 1 This is in large part 
because of home ownership:2 a home is the largest asset that most 
Americans ever purchase and the disparities between black and white 
 
1  See, RAKESH KOCHHAR & RICHARD FRY., PEW RESEARCH CTR., WEALTH INEQUALITY HAS 
WIDENED ALONG RACIAL, ETHNIC LINES SINCE END OF GREAT RECESSION (2014) available at 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/ 
(“White net worth is 13x greater…”) .”); THOMAS M. SHAPIRO ET AL., BRANDEIS UNIV., 
INSTITUTE ON ASSETS AND SOCIAL POLICY, THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP INCREASES FOURFOLD 1 
(2010) (graphing median wealth holdings of White and African American families over two 
decades); 
2 Laura Shin, The Racial Wealth Gap, Forbes, March 26, 2015 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2015/03/26/the-racial-wealth-gap-why-a-typical-
white-household-has-16-times-the-wealth-of-a-black-one/ (“For most U.S. families, a home 
usually comprises the largest portion of their assets.”) 
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Americans in home ownership are significant.3 Thus, the impediments 
to acquiring homes among African-Americans remains a significant 
area of inquiry,4 with scholars focusing in particular on historical 
difficulties in real property acquisition, particularly in the South.5 Why 
the scholarly focus on land acquisition?6 Nearly seventy years ago, 
W.E.B. Du Bois and Gunnar Myrdal famously documented the 
paradox of landless African-American farmers in the South.7 In 
keeping with their observations, the modern economics of 
development asserts that a prevailing explanation for low levels of 
asset acquisition among African-Americans is the accumulated 
consequences of historical barriers to land acquisition.8   
 
3  WILHELMINA LEIGH ET AL., JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, ASSET 
BUILDING IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES OF COLOR: PREDISPOSING FACTORS AND PROMISING 
PRACTICES (2009). 
4  For a comprehensive casebook addressing issues of race and ethnicity in the context of 
property law, see ALBERTO LOPEZ, ALFRED BROPHY AND KALI MURRAY, INTEGRATING 
SPACES: PROPERTY LAW AND RACE (2011). See, also, Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: 
The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513 (2005); Anthony J. 
Taibi, Racial Justice in the Age of the Global Economy, 44 DUKE L.J. 928 (1995); A. Brooke 
Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1431 (1995); 
Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory, 
Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237 (1996); 
Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Useless Property, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1369 (2011); Adam Gordon, 
The Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal Changes in Banking Regulation 
Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to Whites and Out of Reach for Blacks, 115 
YALE L.J. 186 (2005). 
5  See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, African-American Freedom in Antebellum Cumberland County, 
Virginia, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 927 (1995); Thomas W. Mitchell, Destabilizing the 
Normalization of Rural Black Land Loss: A Critical Role for Legal Empiricism, 2005 WIS. L. 
REV. 557 (2005); Thomas W. Mitchell, Stephen Malpezzi & Richard K. Green, Forced Sale 
Risk: Class, Race, and the “Double Discount”, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589 (2010). 
6  The most comprehensive article in this area is by Thomas W. Mitchell, From 
Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black Landownership, Political 
Independence, and Community Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 NW. U. 
L. REV. 505, 517-23 (2001). See also Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, The Liberal 
Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549 (2001) for a shorter discussion. 
7  GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY (1944) (in which the Nobel Laureate Myrdal discusses Du Bois’s reflections on 
black landlessness).  See also John Sibley Butler, Myrdal Revisited: The Negro in Business, 
124 DAEDALUS 199, 205-06 (1995) 
8  See, e.g., Amartya Sen, From Income Inequality to Economic Inequality, in RACE, 
POVERTY, AND DOMESTIC POLICY 59-82 (C. Michael Henry ed., 2004). See also AMARTYA 
SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 1-53 (2000); AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 1-27 
(2009); Roberta Wedge, Amartya Sen Tells International Lawyers to Read Mary, A 
VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MARY, http://avindicationoftherightsofmary.blogspot.com 
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Moreover for African-Americans, even where acquisition was 
possible, land retention has posed a distinct challenge.9 While most 
former slaves never received what they believed to be their promised 
allocation of “forty acres and a mule”10 following the Civil War, many 
newly-freed men were nevertheless able to acquire portions of 
farmland in the rural South. Yet, few were able to retain this land: a 
particularly influential contributor to black land loss were partition 
sales of land held under tenancies in common.11  
  
In the public imagination, the blacks who “got their 40 acres” are 
epitomized by descendants of persons enslaved in the U.S. who were 
able to sidestep bars to property ownership shortly after Emancipation, 
and who are disproportionately likely to own property today.12 Yet, 
the most successful subset of black property owners today are 
 
/2011/03/amartya-sen-tells-international-lawyers.html (last visited August 20, 2011) 
(discussing the current implications of historical barriers to property ownership). 
9  See, e.g., THE BLACK RURAL LANDOWNER—ENDANGERED SPECIES (Leo McGee & 
Robert Boone eds., 1979); see also Mark R. Schulte, The Dream Realized?: African American 
Landownership in Central Georgia Between Reconstruction and World War Two, 72 AGRIC. 
HIST. 298, 307 (1998); Jennifer R. Boone Hargis, Solving Injustice in Inheritance Laws 
Through Judicial Discretion: Common Sense Solutions From Common Law Tradition, 2 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 447 (2003); ROGER RANSOM & RICHARD SUTCH, ONE KIND 
OF FREEDOM: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF EMANCIPATION (1977); ERIC FONER, 
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1988); Mitchell, supra 
note , Dagan & Heller, supra note . 
10  The failure to meet the Reconstruction-era promise of “Forty Acres and a Mule” is well 
documented in BLACK ECON. RESEARCH CTR., ONLY SIX MILLION ACRES: THE DECLINE OF 
BLACK OWNED LAND IN THE RURAL SOUTH, (Robert S. Browne ed., 1973). By way of 
background, in early 1865 General Sherman authorized freed slaves to establish forty-acre 
plots in parts of South Carolina and Georgia.  He also provided them with former military 
mules. However, Sherman’s field order was later revoked, and the land restored to its 
Confederate owners. Although Sherman’s promised land-distribution was never enacted in 
law, rumors of “forty acres and a mule” quickly spread among the former slaves and have 
been part of American historical folklore ever since. Id.  
11  Mitchell, supra; Mitchell et al, supra; Dagan & Heller, supra note . 
12  The phrase “got their 40 acres” is Whoopi Goldberg’s as relayed by Skip Gates, in a 
New York Times op-ed. The phrase also appears to have been used by the late rapper, Tupac 
(Tupac, Letter to the President). Skip Gates argues that his highly successful African 
American interviewees in the PBS miniseries African-American Lives (February 2006) and 
African American Lives 2, (February 2008) are disproportionately likely to be descendants of 
freedmen who became property owners early. See Henry Louis Gates Jr., Op-Ed., Forty Acres 
and a Gap in Wealth, N.Y. TIMES, November 18, 2007, § 4, at 14. 
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descendants of free black migrants who originated outside the U.S; 13 
these free black migrants, overwhelmingly British subjects, 
originating from the Caribbean islands known as the West Indies,14 are 
largely invisible in the legal scholarship.    Before 1965, when 
comprehensive immigration legislation led to the removal of de facto 
“racial origins” quotas, it was very difficult for Africans to migrate to 
the U.S. Thus, black migrants to the U.S. were overwhelmingly West 
Indians, who had the advantage of easy transportation routes to the 
Eastern Seaboard and near-automatic classification as British 
subjects.15 Indeed, over eighty percent of black migrants to the U.S. 
 
13  See, e.g., Winston James, Explaining Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility in the United 
States: Beyond the Sowell Thesis, 44 COMP. STUD. IN SOC’Y & HIST. 218 (2002) [hereinafter 
James, Explaining Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility]; see also Winston James, New Light on 
Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility in New York City, A Critique of the Sowell Thesis, in NEW 
CARIBBEAN THOUGHT: A READER (Brian Meeks & Folke Lindahl eds., 2001) [hereinafter 
James, New Light on Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility]; IRA DE A. REID, THE NEGRO 
IMMIGRANT: HIS BACKGROUND, CHARACTERISTICS, AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT, 1899-1937 
(1969); NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT (1970); 
ETHNICITY: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE (Nathan Glazer & Daniel Patrick Moynihan eds., 1975). 
14  I will regularly refer to two groups of blacks. The first group, African Americans, 
includes those descended from Africans enslaved in the U.S. The second group includes 
persons who were enslaved in the West Indies (hereinafter “West Indians”) and who later 
became migrants to the U.S., mostly after the abolition of slavery. The term is “shorthand” 
since, although West Indians are overwhelmingly the descendants of Africans enslaved in the 
West Indies, there are also West Indian immigrants to the U.S. of other ethnic backgrounds. I 
utilize the definition of West Indians that is conventionally used in the sociological literature, 
namely, Anglophone (formerly British-colonized) Caribbean nationals. The migrants were 
overwhelmingly descendants of slaves and “coloreds.” The sociologist-historian Orlando 
Patterson provides a summary of the significance of the West Indies from which the migrants 
originated and its social structure as follows:  
“The sugar plantations, which became all-important by the turn of the eighteenth century, 
made the Afro-Caribbean societies the richest areas of the world.  They also set the basic 
social structure and tone of these societies.  African slaves were brought in on a large scale, 
resulting in the early demographic dominance of black people.  Ruling them was a small 
minority of white planters . . . Between masters and slaves a third group soon emerged—the 
coloreds or people of mixed ancestry.  This group formed a useful racial and socio-cultural 
buffer between the whites and blacks.  By the end of the eighteenth century a substantial 
number of them were freedmen.” See Orlando Patterson, Context and Choice in Ethnic 
Allegiance: A Theoretical Framework and Caribbean Case Study, in ETHNICITY: THEORY AND 
EXPERIENCE, supra note  [hereinafter Patterson, Ethnic Allegiance]. 
15I focus on an early population of black West Indian migrants who entered between 1890 
and 1924, before comprehensive immigration reform (in 1924) brought their entry to a 
virtual halt. The immigration challenges faced by this early population are discussed in 
Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, How The US selected for A Black Bourgeoisie: A 
Narrative of Inadvertent Institutional Design, Forthcoming GEO. IMMIGR L.J (2014) 
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before 1960 were West Indian and fifty percent of all black migrants 
to the U.S. before 1960 originated from one island, Jamaica.16 
My focus in this Article is on the evolution of property regimes within 
the West Indian islands both during plantation slavery and after 
Emancipation, as well as how West Indian migrants to the U.S. 
 
And what of Africans from Africa? Prior to 1965, it was very difficult for blacks from 
Africa to migrate to the U.S. The typical African migrant was like President Obama’s father 
– a highly skilled temporary migrant admitted to an elite graduate program on a short-term 
visa. For a long time, West Indians “slipped in,” escaping Congressional attention – largely 
because they were classified as British subjects and because of their tiny numbers (in 
relation to the larger immigrant pool). The relevance of race in immigration admission prior 
to 1965 has been the subject of extensive commentary in the legal scholarship. See IAN F. 
HANEY-LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 42-44 (1996) 
(discussing how performing “whiteness” often functioned as a prerequisite for admission 
and naturalization). The literature has comprehensively detailed the challenges that a variety 
of groups, including Mexicans, Japanese, Chinese, Indians, Puerto Ricans and Filipinos 
encountered in attaining admission and later naturalization.  See KEVIN JOHNSON, 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER: ¿SÍ SE PUEDE? (2011); KEVIN JOHNSON, 
HOW DID YOU GET TO BE MEXICAN?: A WHITE/BROWN MAN’S SEARCH FOR IDENTITY (1999) 
(all books on Mexican immigrants in particular and Latinos more generally), IAN HANEY-
LOPEZ, supra  (discussing Latino, Asian and Arab immigrants), MAE NGAI, THE LUCKY 
ONES: ONE FAMILY AND THE EXTRAORDINARY INVENTION OF CHINESE AMERICA (2010) (on 
Chinese immigrants); Leti Volpp, Obnoxious To Their Very Nature: Asian Americans and 
Constitutional Citizenship, 8 Asian L.J. 71 (2001) (on Asian immigrants); Leti Volpp, The 
Culture of Citizenship, 8 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 571 (2007) (same); LAURA E. GÓMEZ, 
MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN RACE (2007) (on Mexican 
immigrants), PAUL R. SPICKARD, JAPANESE AMERICANS: THE FORMATION AND 
TRANSFORMATIONS OF AN ETHNIC GROUP (1996) (on Japanese immigrants); HIROSHI 
MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING, Introduction (2006) (containing personal reflections 
on Japanese immigrants in particular).   
16 Winston James has a comprehensive statistical summary of pre-1965 black immigration 
to the U.S. by region of origin. Early black immigrants were overwhelmingly of Caribbean 
origin.  Prior to World War II, blacks known as “British West Indians” appeared to 
outnumber all other black migrant groups by a large margin, with Jamaica, the most 
populated British West Indian island, supplying the largest number of immigrants.  Indeed, 
Jamaicans have been the largest group of black Caribbean immigrants to the U.S. since the 
mid-19th century, and have only recently been overtaken by Nigerians.  James points out the 
following important caveat: in the late 19th or early 20th century, it is unclear whether dark-
skinned persons of Spanish Caribbean origin (such as persons from the Dominican Republic 
or Cuba) would have been classified as “black” at the time of landing in the U.S. See, 
Winston James, Explaining Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility in the United States: Beyond 
the Sowell Thesis, 44 COMP. STUD. IN SOC’Y & HIST. 218 (2002) [hereinafter James, 
Explaining Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility]; see also Winston James, New Light on Afro-
Caribbean Social Mobility in New York City, A Critique of the Sowell Thesis, in NEW 
CARIBBEAN THOUGHT: A READER (Brian Meeks & Folke Lindahl eds., 2001) [hereinafter 
James, New Light on Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility]. 
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translated their long-time experience in West Indian property markets 
to success in the U.S. Which islands do I include? I use the term 
“British West Indies,” “West Indies” or “West India” namely to refer 
to the Caribbean islands in the Greater and Lesser Antilles.17 Migrants 
from these islands shared the following characteristics. First, they 
were British colonized. Second they were dominated by sugar 
plantations.18 Third, the colonies were largely administered through a 
common governance structure, the Colonial Office, established by 
Westminster to govern the colonies. Importantly, the islands were 
generally operated under a legal “supra structure” – a common legal 
framework based heavily on the common law and statutes passed in 
Westminster.19   
 
There is one more definitional point: I use the term plantation slaves 
to mean chattel slaves, who were purchased or inherited and owned as 
property, and who functioned as laborers on large agricultural 
plantations producing commodities—particularly sugar—primarily 
 
17 The main members include Antigua and Barbuda (which were governed by the British as 
a political unit), St. Kitts and Nevis (same), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (same), Trinidad 
and Tobago (same), Barbados, St. Lucia, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, and Guyana. I also 
include one mainland sugar colony, British Guiana (now Guyana), from which many black 
migrants also originated. 
18 British West Indian agriculture was generally dominated by sugar plantations staffed by 
slaves; however, there were a few islands where this was not the case (and which I exclude). 
For example, I exclude British Honduras (Belize) in Central America, which was not a sugar 
colony, although it was governed alongside the West Indies.  Bermuda, Bahamas and the 
Cayman Islands as well as the British Virgin Islands are excluded for similar reasons. 
Although the West Indies were not exclusively British colonized, the British were the 
largest regional players – the French, Spanish, Danes, Dutch and Portugese were typically 
less influential. In any event early black migrants were overwhelmingly British subjects.  
Mintz provides a good summary of differential importance of sugar in different islands. 
19 Why was this feature of island governance important? There is an extensive literature 
demonstrating that differences in the legal tradition that countries inherited from their 
colonial administrators may have a long-run impact on the economic opportunities available 
to their median resident. La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 
(2008). “The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins,” Journal of Economic Literature, 
46(2): pp. 285-332 For example, countries with English common law origins provide their 
median residents with stronger protection of property and contract rights and are less prone 
to government interference in private commercial relations that countries with civil law 
origins.  Id. It is unlikely that differences in the access of the median resident to property in 
different islands may be attributed to differences in common law or statutory frameworks, 
since they were all generally operating under the same template, although from time to time 
there were legal idiosyncrasies in individual islands, due to regulations promulgated by local 
Governors or local representative legislatures. 
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for European markets.20 I emphasize this because plantation slavery 
as an institution, and its effect on property acquisition among chattel 
slaves, is central to my thesis.  I should emphasize I do not address 
property ownership among those who were subject to other forms of 
forced labor in the West Indies – including, for example, forced 
peonage and indentured servitude, although many West Indians of 
other racial and ethnic backgrounds, such as South Asian West 
Indians, were also victims of these practices.21  
 
II. SLAVERY IN THE WEST INDIES: LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR 
REAL (ESTATE) SUCCESS IN NEW YORK 
I have previously argued in other work that West Indian property 
arrangements, first informal and later formal, provided a political and 
economic structure in which West Indians had time to finesse their 
abilities as property owners and contractors long before immigrating 
to the U.S.22 The most striking aspect of these property and contracting 
institutions, is that they first emerged under slavery, even as formal 
property ownership by slaves was not recognized legally. These 
institutions continued to form during the period of Apprenticeship, a 
transitional regime of mixed slave and free labor, and finally flower as 
a formal and full-fledged property regime during full Emancipation. 
 
Despite the crucial legal importance of Emancipation—namely, that 
slaves who were once property themselves were free and could hold 
legal title—the literature addressing differences in the patterns of 
acquisition of property, particularly real property, between African 
Americans and West Indians migrants is almost entirely in the social 
 
20 This is the definition used by Mintz and Hall. Sidney Mintz and Douglas Hall, The 
Origins of the Jamaican Internal Marketing System (New Haven: Department of 
Anthropology, Yale University, 1960)  
21 The Introduction to the Heuman and Walvin slavery reader contains an excellent 
discussion of the distinctions between these different forms of forced labor. GAD HEUMAN 
AND JAMES WALVIN, THE SLAVERY READER (2003). 
22 Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, The Blacks Who “Got Their Forty Acres”: A Theory of 
Black West Indian Migrant Asset Acquisition, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 27 (2014). 
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sciences. Why are the landlords in Harlem and Brooklyn West Indian, 
the tenants African-American? 23 These are tough questions.24 
  
A major assumption implicit in the literature, namely that West 
Indians and African Americans were in the “same boat” upon arrival 
in New York, needs to be called into question. It seems that before 
assuming that black migrants from the West Indies are a useful 
comparative sample to internal black migrants from the U.S. South, 
there are three basic questions to be addressed. First, what property 
did West Indians have before they came? Second, how did the U.S. 
immigration authorities decide which West Indians would be allowed 
to immigrate and do these immigration-related processes shed any 
light on what West Indian immigrants might have brought with them?  
 
Before focusing on the processes by which the forebears of West 
Indian migrants came to own real property before they came to the 
U.S., I first briefly address the processes by which they were selected 
to come here. As I have noted in other work, alongside the 
disadvantages that black West Indians suffered inside a nativist 
immigration regime, there is a parallel history of West Indians 
generally, and elites in particular, enjoying peculiar benefits in 
immigration admission. The immigration institutions were clearly 
 
23RONALD SCHMIDT SR., ET AL., NEWCOMERS, OUTSIDERS, AND INSIDERS:  IMMIGRANTS 
AND AMERICAN RACIAL POLITICS IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 111 (2009); Kyle D. 
Crowder, Residential Segregation of West Indians in the New York/New Jersey Metropolitan 
Area:  The Role of Race and Ethnicity, 33 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 79 (1999); see also EMILY 
ROSENBAUM AND SAMANTHA FRIEDMAN, THE HOUSING DIVIDE:  HOW GENERATIONS OF 
IMMIGRANTS FARE IN NEW YORK’S HOUSING MARKET (2007). 
24 See THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE: A WORLD VIEW 250-258 (1994), Three 
Black Histories, in ESSAYS AND DATA ON AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS (Thomas Sowell ed., 
1978), RHETORIC OR REALITY? (1984), THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE: AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1983), THE SLAVE ECONOMY OF THE OLD SOUTH. See also 
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST, THE SOCIAL VALUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY ch. 26 
(1995); GLAZER & MOYNIHAN, supra note; REYNOLDS FARLEY & WALTER ALLEN, THE COLOR 
LINE AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN AMERICA (1989), esp. ch. 12; Suzanne Model, Caribbean 
Immigrants: A Black Success Story? 25 INT’L MIGRATION REV. (1991); PHILIP KASINITZ, 
CARIBBEAN NEW YORK: BLACK IMMIGRANTS AND THE POLITICS OF RACE 90-95 (1992); 
BECOMING NEW YORKERS (Philip Kasinitz et al. eds., 2004); STEPHEN STEINBERG, THE ETHNIC 
MYTH: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CLASS IN AMERICA (1989) [hereinafter STEINBERG, THE ETHNIC 
MYTH]; ORLANDO PATTERSON, Introduction to RITUALS OF BLOOD: THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
SLAVERY IN TWO AMERICAN CENTURIES (1999) [hereinafter PATTERSON, RITUALS]. 
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selecting for more moneyed black immigrants, even if this was being 
done inadvertently. Thus, it is not at all clear that early West Indians 
migrants to northern cities, like New York, are an appropriate 
comparative sample to early internal African American migrants 
arriving in New York at the turn of the century.25  
Pursuing the first question, West Indians have had a long and complex 
history in the property markets before they ever set foot in the United 
States.  Critical to my thesis is the view that there were important 
institutional idiosyncrasies in the West Indies that played an important 
role in the evolution of slave property ownership during plantation 
slavery.26 The background to this narrative is the particular political 
 
25 A relative question is whether African American internal migrants were also likely to be 
relative elites in relation to their Southern peers who stayed behind. For data in support of 
this position see NEIL FLIGSTEIN, GOING NORTH (1981). See also CAROLE MARKS, 
FAREWELL, WE’RE GOOD AND GONE: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION (1989); DANIEL 
JOHNSON AND REX CAMPBELL, BLACK MIGRATION IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL DEMOGRAPHIC 
HISTORY (1981). 
26 I should note that the literature was for decades focused on institutional similarities 
between plantation slavery in the U.S. and the West Indies. Prior to the American 
Revolution, as the narrative is conventionally told, the American colonies and the West 
Indies (as British colonies) had histories that were inextricably intertwined. It was in the 
West Indies that plantation slavery was “perfected” (to use the words of Ulrich Phillips, the 
controversial early historian of the U.S. South) before it was “exported” to other colonies 
(such as the Carolinas). Simply put, the genesis of slavery in the British Americas was West 
Indian. In Phillips words: 
As regards Negro slavery the history of the West Indies is inseparable from that of North 
America. In them the plantation system originated and reached its greatest scale, and from 
them the institution of slavery was extended to the continent. The industrial system on the 
islands, and particularly on those occupied by the British, is accordingly instructive as an 
introduction and a parallel to the continental regime.  
Whatever early institutional similarities there may have been between the plantation systems 
in the West Indies and the U.S. South, the institutional differences between the West Indies 
and the U.S. South will be clear to many readers of the larger book – even as I do not 
typically make overt comparisons to plantation slavery in the U.S.   See ULRICH B. PHILLIPS, 
AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY: A SURVEY OF THE SUPPLY, EMPLOYMENT AND CONTROL OF 
NEGRO LABOR AS DETERMINED BY THE PLANTATION RÉGIME 46 (1918). As the historian 
Betty Wood establishes, most early African slaves who were imported into the English 
colonies (that later became the United States) came from the West Indies. Prior to the early 
1700s, it was difficult to acquire slaves from Africa in the colonies that became the United 
States; most Africans were sold in the West Indies. One of the early large-scale importations 
of African slaves in the American colonies occurred when Barbadian planters—who played 
a significant role in the founding of South Carolina in 1670—imported slaves from 
Barbados. See BETTY WOOD, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 64–65 (1997) (discussing 
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economy of the colonial West Indies. The critical fact about the West 
Indian colonies was their size and relative isolation. Extraordinarily 
well suited to sugar production but tiny and difficult to supply, West 
Indian sugar plantations were simultaneously very important to the 
Exchequer (British Treasury), and the source of significant discomfort 
to the Crown. The Crown was deeply disturbed by the instability of 
West Indian shipping routes,27 easily disrupted by the vagaries of 
skirmishes with other European powers (particularly the French). 
Indeed, Jamaica at the peak of its productivity in the late eighteenth 
century was among the most valuable British colonies and worth more 
than all of the New England colonies combined.28 The British were 
desperate to mitigate the impact of war on supplies generally and 
particularly fresh food supplies, not only for their British compatriots 
but also for the slaves.   
 
These features of the political economy of the West Indies provided 
incentives for the plantocracy (with the support of the Parliament) to 
innovate in property and contracting arrangements with respect to the 
slave population. Given perennial shipping challenges and food 
shortages, their important task was to get the slaves to feed themselves. 
The critical interests of Parliament, the plantocracy, and the slavers 
were aligned in achieving this goal – there would be less of a stress on 
precious plantation working capital (no cash outlays needed to import 
food from London), Parliament would not need to entertain pained 
 
the connection between the Lowcountry, as the English called present-day South Carolina, 
and settlers from Barbados).  The classics in this area are too numerous to mention in a brief 
footnote. For a good introduction to the literature in the area, you can hardly do better than 
The Slavery Reader, ed. by Rigas Doganis, Gad Heuman, James Walvin, Routledge 2003, 
which has an extensive introduction to plantation slavery as an institution, particularly in the 
West Indies and the Southern U.S. 
 
27 The historian Selwyn Carrington is a particularly strong proponent of the influence of war 
and the instability of shipping routes on West Indian sugar. See Veront Satchell, Slave 
Labour and Sugar Production in Jamaica 1760–1830, at 11–12 (1997) (noting Carrington’s 
argument that the American Revolutionary War was deeply threatening to West Indian 
sugar as “Caribbean sugar producers were extremely dependent on British North America 
for all commodities necessary for them to produce sugar”). 
28The islands had become important to the economic wellbeing of the British Empire as a 
major source of revenue for the British Treasury, which levied ample taxes on the planters’ 
profits. See SHERLOCK & BENNETT, supra note , at 281–82 (discussing the onerous tax 
regime). 
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reports from the colonies about how slave malnutrition was 
compromising plantation productivity, and the Treasury’s coffers 
could continue to rely on plantation taxes. Moreover, slave were 
understandably eager for a system that would keep them better fed. 
 
So, what sort of system did they create? As economists have long told 
us, secure entitlements incentivize effort; commerce increases the 
payoff from effort even more. The plantocracy understood this with 
respect to local food production; so they supported what came to be 
called a provisioning system. This system created “provision 
grounds,” or informal slave entitlements in plots to grow food and to 
the produce that came from these plots. The result was the evolution 
of a slave culture involving increasingly complex forms of property 
arrangements, including inheritance-like devices. The thesis is very 
Demsetzian – property rights emerged in response to the demand for 
them. Moreover, perhaps also as an incentive to slave productivity, the 
English allowed slaves to increasingly engage in commerce; they were 
allowed to sell surplus produce and became the dominant players in 
the food economy.29 
By utilizing provision grounds, the British granted de facto property 
“rights” to West Indian slaves, qua slaves, thereby creating the largest 
“property-lite” owning class of blacks in the Americas (or property 
owners-in-waiting, as I call them).30 In the absence of formal legal 
norms, slaves nevertheless developed a concept of property based on 
communal understandings. These communal understandings were 
tacitly acknowledged by both fellow slaves and the English, even in 
the absence of legal sanction. Indeed, the customary norms were so 
pervasive that the English plantation class rarely interfered with slave-
owned property.31 Only later did this customary framework of 
property ownership among slaves evolve into formal law.  
Not all members of the plantocracy, however, viewed these 
developments as positive. Some feared that the roots of the ultimate 
 
29 See e.g. Lorna Simmonds, Slave Higglering in Jamaica 1780-1834, 20 JAMAICA J. 31 
(1987) 
30 Chapter 1 
31 See infra 
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failure of plantation society would lie in the provisioning system. One 
need only consider the views of Henry Ross, a prominent English 
planter, barrister and legislator in the Eastern Caribbean who blamed 
the demise of plantation society and of sharecropping on provisioning. 
Ross felt that there was a fundamental contradiction between laboring 
on a plantation (whether as a slave or subsequently as a laborer) and 
planting provision grounds at the very edge of that same plantation. In 
his view, a laborer was either about the Master’s business or he was 
about his own, but he could not do both. Thus, if the provision grounds 
were formally the property of the Master, the provisions that were 
proceeds also belonged to the Master. To allow slaves the benefit of 
selling the provisions in a market economy, and pocketing the 
proceeds blurred the distinction between what belonged to the Master 
and what belonged to the slave in a dangerous way. 
Ross’s predictions ultimately proved prescient.32 For example, after 
British Emancipation, planters in the West Indies were not successful 
(especially compared to planters in the U.S. South) in guaranteeing a 
 
32 The clear implication of Ross’s writings is that such provisioning arrangements would 
never have been allowed in societies that were serious about the maintenance of plantation 
slavery. Woodville, Marshall, A ‘Valued Pamphlet’: Henry James Ross's Rationale for 
Sharecropping in the West Indies. SLAVERY & ABOLITION, 2003, Vol. 24(3), p.82-111 
Surely one such society would be the U.S. South. Dylan Penningroth’s work would suggest 
the sporadic evolution of property ownership among slaves  in certain Southern states. 
DYLAN PENNINGROTH, THE CLAIMS OF KINFOLK, AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY AND 
PROPERTY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2003); Dylan Penningroth, The Claims of Slaves 
and Ex-Slaves to Family and Property: A Transatlantic Comparison, 112 AM. HIST. 
REV. 1039, 1039-69 (2007).  
 
Of course, some scholars have emphasized other factors that accounted for the low 
prevalence of sharecropping in the British West Indies in comparison to both the U.S. South 
and Caribbean islands colonized by other powers such as the Spanish, French and the 
Portugese or islands with a mixed colonial heritage such as St Lucia (French and English). 
Sharecropping was also alternatively known as metayage, metairie and mezzadria in 
Caribbean islands. For a discussion of some of these other factors, including legislative 
framework, demographic differences etc. see e.g., Marshall, Metayage in the Sugar Industry 
of the British West Indian Islands, 5 THE JAMAICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 32 (1965); ADRIEN, 
METAYAGE, CAPITALISM AND PEASANT DEVELOPMENT IN ST. LUCIA, 1840-1957 (1996) and 
Howard Johnson, The Share System in the Bahamas in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Centuries 5 SLAVERY AND ABOLITION 2 (1994).  Among many titles, they cite particularly 
heavily to the following texts as providing a basis for a comparative review of 
sharecropping in the U.S. South and the West Indies. RANSOM AND SUTCH, ONE KIND OF 
FREEDOM: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF EMANCIPATION (1977) and Sholomowitz, The 
Origins of Southern Sharecropping, 53 Agricultural History 568 (1979). 
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continued cheap labor force through arrangements such as 
sharecropping. The root of the failure of the planters’ efforts to tie 
former slaves to the plantations lay in the very food markets that 
planters had encouraged during slavery – slaves were already cash 
rich. Generally, as long as land was available former slaves were 
sceptical of sharecropping – they wanted to become freeholders. It is 
striking that despite its tiny size, the West Indies witnesses the 
emergence of the largest group of black owners of real property in the 
Americas within four decades of Emancipation in the British Empire. 
In analyzing the development of this large propertied class, I focus 
particularly on the following roles that African slaves and their 
freedmen descendants held in relation to property:  
(1) slaves who “by their own labor” were acquiring property in their 
Master’s land during slavery;  
(2) “freedmen” who were de jure freeholders following Emancipation  
(3) “freedmen” who were de jure tenants on sugar cane estates 
following Emancipation  
 
III.  THE EXERTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS BY  SLAVES AND FREEDMEN 
 
There are three general categories of property rights: the exclusive 
right to use an asset, the right to appropriate its economic value, and 
the right to alienate the asset.33 As a matter of customary practice, 
West Indian slaves had the first two of these three rights, namely the 
exclusive right to use an asset and the right to appropriate its economic 
value, and even elements of the third: as long as a slave remained with 
the plantation the land set aside for his personal use was his alone to 
tend; it would not be allocated to someone else.34 Thus, through these 
rights, a slave essentially had constructive control of the property. 
When the system first developed and prevailed, the slave’s control was 
 
33 THRÁINN EGGERTSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 34–35 (1990). 
 
34 See infra  
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not codified in law. Rather, as a matter of law, the land remained under 
the control of the plantation owner. Therefore, the slave’s “control” of 
the land was a matter of customary practice.35 This control is further 
reflected in the fact that trespass by others (particularly other slaves) 
was systematically discouraged.36 Hence, the system embodied the 
principle of exclusive control, even if this principle was not codified. 
 
Second, slaves had the right to appropriate their land’s economic 
value—whatever the slave farmed, she was allowed to keep.37 Again, 
however, the operative principle is constructive benefit. The proceeds 
of the property were technically those of the plantation owner, given 
his formal ownership of the property. However, as a matter of practice, 
the proceeds of the slave’s plot were his own. When slaves were later 
informally allowed to sell produce and livestock from their plot, the 
principle of constructive benefit was further augmented. 
 
Finally, aspects of the principle of transfer—the third property right—
were also featured in this system, if only constructively. If a slave had 
children, upon his death, the land was then allocated to his children.38 
While the slave may not have been able to formally transfer the land, 
in local parlance it was “passed down” upon his death to his children, 
who most likely remained with the plantation. In so doing, the system 
also approximated the property right principle of transfer, although 
without formal institutional support.39 The real test of the “rights” of 
 
35 See Mintz & Hall, supra note , at 21–22 (pointing out that under slavery, Jamaican slaves 
were allowed much freedom in the cultivation of their lands). 
36 See id.. 
37 See infra Part 
38  See BESSON, supra note , at 28–29 (noting a customary inheritance system amongst the 
slaves in which they could bequeath land rights to whomever they thought proper). 
39 It is perhaps useful to recall the work of Douglass North, the modern father of the 
“institutions school” who emphasized the importance of institutions to enforce these rights. 
See Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley, The Contribution of Douglass North to New 
Institutional Economics, in ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, RIGHTS, GROWTH, AND SUSTAINABILITY: 
THE LEGACY OF DOUGLASS NORTH (Sebastian Galiani & Itai Sened eds., forthcoming 2013) 
(manuscript at 2) (chronicling the contribution of Douglass North to the “development and 
institutionalization of NIE,” New Institutional Economics). North explained that property 
rights mean little without institutions to enforce them. See id. at 10 (emphasizing the key role 
of institutions and contract enforcement in protection of property rights). North’s definition 
of “institutions” is broad. See id. at 8, 23 (explaining that North included not only laws and 
formal written codes, but also social norms and beliefs in the umbrella concept of 
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these nascent property holders, however, was Emancipation which 
represented  a sea-change in the relationship between the slaveholder 
turned employer and the slave turned employee. 
Slavery was abolished in the British Empire in 1838.40  Of the 800,000 
slaves freed worldwide, the overwhelming majority were in the British 
West Indies.41 Around half of these slaves had previously been rural 
slaves employed on sugar estates.42 It was from this group of de facto 
property owners and contracting parties that real property owners and 
contractors soon emerged—the de jure freeholders mentioned 
above.43 
 
Implicit in the slave-owner/slave relationship are the reciprocal 
obligations of the slave to work to the advantage of the slave owner, 
 
“institution”); see also NORTH, supra note , at 4 (explaining that his analysis of institutions 
includes both formal and informal constraints). Modern law and development literature, in 
contrast, equates “institutions” with a formal legal system, including a set of laws, 
practitioners, courts, and judges. Tom Ginsburg, Review Essay, Does Law Matter for 
Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 829, 832 (2000) 
(noting that North’s focus on constraining institutions resulted in a new wave of law and 
development). It is in precisely this sense that I argue that slaves were part of a property rights 
framework undergirded by an informal set of “rules.”  
 
40 There are several excellent histories of Slavery Abolition Act. Good introductions include 
Pollock (1997), Hague (2007), Tompkins (2007), Brown (2005) and Hohschild (2005). 
There  are competing accounts of which factors most contributed to the demise of slavery 
including the decreasing dependence of the Treasury on taxes from sectors dependent on 
slavery, the declining interest of the plantocracy compared to other interests such as the free 
traders and the merchant class, the coalition of interests between the abolitionists and other 
sectors who for independent reasons sought to weaken the plantocracy, and the increasing 
influence of evangelical Christian abolitionists within the Church of England.  Few dispute 
though that had it been left to the “West India” interests, abolition would have been – yet 
again – postponed. There was a widespread understanding among the slaves that they had 
been freed by the “Queen” (that is, the Crown), which they understood to be a distinct entity 
from local government, particularly given latter’s overwhelming domination by plantation 
interests.   See HOLT, supra note , at 7–8 (explaining that in the early 1800s, “Great Britain 
took its first steps toward dismantling its Americas slave empire . . . [by] abolish[ing] the 
slave trade in 1807, requir[ing] . . . slaveowners to ameliorate the living and working 
conditions of slaves in 1823 . . . and proclaim[ing] complete emancipation in 1838”). 
41SHERLOCK & BENNETT, supra note , at 213 (noting that there were more than 300,000 
slaves on the island). 
42 HOLT, supra note , at 121. 
43WILMOT, supra note , at 6–12 (describing the foundation of religious settlements and 
independent communities shortly after emancipation which resulted in 50,000 former 
Jamaican slaves owning an average of three acres each). 
7 Brown post Emancipation  6/23/2016  8:37 AM 
 
118  
and for the slave-owner to provide means the slave such as food and 
shelter. The allocation of land to slaves allowed the planters an 
unconventional mechanism of meeting their obligation to provide food 
and shelter. One need only recall the reflections of the “planter-
politician–man of letters” (and highly influential opponent of 
Emancipation), Bryan Edwards, in recommending the virtues of the 
“Jamaican system” to planters in other colonies:  
The practice which prevails in Jamaica of giving the Negroes lands to 
cultivate, from the produce of which they are expected to maintain 
themselves (except in times of scarcity, arising from hurricanes and 
droughts, when assistance is never denied them) is universally allowed 
to be judicious and beneficial; producing a happy coalition of interests 
between the master and the slave. The Negro who has acquired by his 
own labour a property in his master's land, has much to lose, and is 
therefore less inclined to desert his work. He earns a little money, by 
which he is enabled to indulge himself in fine clothes on holidays, and 
gratify his palate with salted meats and other provisions that otherwise 
he could not obtain; and the proprietor is eased, in a great measure, of 
the expense of feeding him (emphasis added)44  
In Edwards’ reflections, it becomes clear that a system in which the 
“Negro acquired by his own labour a property in his master’s land” 
allows the master to meet his obligations to the slave, even as the slave 
meets his obligations to his master.   
It was for good reason that Edwards was known as the “philosopher-
planter.” You will note that his language describing the virtues of the 
Jamaican is highly reminiscent of Locke – never mind that we are 
dealing with forced labor.45  His Lockian arguments against abolition 
were effective – he had the ear of many parliamentarians. He 
repeatedly insisted to great effect that a Jamaican slave “with property 
 
44 2 BRYAN EDWARDS, THE HISTORY, CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL, OF THE BRITISH COLONIES IN 
THE WEST INDIES 371, 373 (3d ed. 1806). 
45 An excellent background discussion of the philosophy that would underlie a slave 
“acquiring property in his master’s property through his own labor” is included in Eric 
Claeys, “Locke Unlocked: Productive Use in Trespass, Adverse Possession, and Labor 
Theory,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1759551. 
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in his master’s land” was better off than an English peasant on his 
Lord’s land.46  
My point is that the system of allocating provision lands to slaves was 
widely supported at multiple levels of plantation society. 
Emancipation threatened to turn everything upside down. Once labor 
becomes free, this relationship of reciprocal obligation (which is 
fundamentally a status relationship) is completely severed. Any 
contractual relationship—be it one grounded in tenancy or 
employment—is fundamentally far more tenuous for the planter than 
a relationship grounded in status.  
And what to do with the property which the slave occupies but which 
the planter legally owns? If the freedman continues to work for the 
planter, perhaps there is a continuing basis for his continuing to 
occupy provision grounds at the edge of the plantation. In such a case, 
the planter has a clear justification for the continuing occupation of the 
land by the former slave: labor can be understood as an in-kind rental 
payment. Indeed, such an arrangement may even be beneficial to the 
planter’s cash flow. Theoretically he “pays” the freedman in kind, with 
less of a need for a cash outlay.  
Suppose the freedman declines employment on the plantation? One 
can expect the planter to ask himself the following: Why is a former 
slave, now freedman, remaining on land that is formally mine, if I am 
no longer obligated to provide for him? What am I getting out of it? 
Predictably, there was a face-off between the planters and the 
freedmen.  
The options that confronted West Indian freedmen when they sought 
to exercise their newfound freedom are reminiscent of Albert 
Hirschman’s famous conceptual ultimatum (“voice/exit/loyalty”).47 
They had three options. First, they could remain on the plantation in 
an employment relationship largely on the planter’s terms (“loyalty”) 
– for example, they could continue to accept wages that were planter-
 
46 It is for good reason that one scholar notes that having read Edwards one wonders 
whether “our conceptions of freedom and unfreedom are too narrow.” Edwards posed the 
question: how unfree could a slave really be if he is propertied? 
47 See ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970). 
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determined as stipulated by the regulations governing the 
Apprenticeship regime. 
 
Second, they could remain on the plantation but with a more robust set 
of protections. These protections would include guaranteed leave 
(particularly for the women who ran the markets, and wanted 
guaranteed days off to prepare for weekend markets), assurances that 
they could reap crops planted even in the event of a later severing of 
the employment relationship and eviction, and market determined 
wages (which would theoretically be subject to some bargaining on 
the part of freedmen, particularly in those islands where labor was 
inclined to be short). This would approximate “voice.”  Those 
exercising “voice” could extract concessions for their ongoing loyalty.   
 
The final option of course is exit. Those who had assets could actually 
credibly threaten to exit undesirable plantation relationships, and 
could do so. My argument is that across the region, exit predominated; 
that is freedmen becoming de jure freeholders was the predominant 
choice.   
 
The likelihood that slaves would exit depended largely on two factors 
– the availability of cash and the availability of land. 48 Certainly in 
the earliest days of Emancipation, any cash that the slaves had would 
have most likely been accumulated during slavery. The availability of 
cash with which they could buy land was in turn tied to the 
extensiveness of the provisioning system during slavery in a particular 
island.   
 
A primary reason that the West Indies is such a wonderful place for a 
comparative study of the evolution of property regimes (in practice as 
opposed to just in law) is that there were distinct topological and size 
differences between the islands that had significant implications for 
land allocation, both during and after slavery. For example, some 
colonies (e.g. Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago) were larger 
 
48 Donald Harris, The Circuit of Capital and the ‘Labour Problem’ in Capitalist 
Development, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, Vol. 37 (March-June 1988), pp. 15-31.  
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with more plentiful arable land.49 And even when planters were 
unwilling to give arable land to slaves, there remained more marginal 
land in close proximity to the plantations on which the slaves could 
plant.50 Other islands (e.g. Barbados, St. Vincent, St. Kitts) were much 
smaller – planters were less inclined to be generous, because every 
acre given to slave was an acre not available for sugar plantation.51 So 
in these islands, although provisioning did occur, it was more marginal 
– with garden “plots” as opposed to more fulsome lands.52 Particularly 
in Barbados, which is nearly entirely flat, nearly all land was 
consumed by the plantocracy.53  
 
Thus, in the larger islands, the provisioning system was much more 
extensive. Slaves grew more food and the food markets were more 
plentiful. There were myriad cash crops that would allow for slaves to 
accumulate assets. Moreover, since manumission was ongoing 
(certainly up to the beginning of Apprenticeship) there were real 
incentives to accumulate cash.54  The bottom line: in the larger islands 
like Jamaica and Guyana, slaves were more likely to have cash 
because they had been serious market participants for some time.55 
Moreover, in these territories, there was more land to buy.56  
 
 
49 A good description of the differences between the islands is in B.W. Higman, A CONCISE 
HISTORY OF THE CARIBBEAN (2011). 
50 For example, in Jamaica the more marginal lands were hilly (at the edge of the 
plantations). In Guyana, the more marginal lands were prone to flooding.For a discussion of 
the topographies of a few of the individual islands see PHILIP SHERLOCK & HAZEL BENNETT, 
THE STORY OF THE JAMAICAN PEOPLE (1998); R. Farley, The Rise of the Peasantry in British 
Guiana, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 87-103; S. Mintz, Reflections 
on Caribbean peasantries, New West Indian Guide 57 (1983): no 1/2.  
51 Woodville Marshall, Provision ground and planation labour in four windward islands: 
Competition for resources during slavery, SLAVERY AND ABOLITION, 1991, Vol. 12 (1), p. 
48-67. 
52Id. 
53 Id. 
54 One need only consider that the purchase of freedom (not to mention the freedom of 
family members) became more expensive as early as the late 1700s, when it became 
apparent that the abolition of the slave trade (as opposed to slavery) was imminent (it 
ultimately happened 30 years before Emancipation in 1808). With the imminent abolition of 
the slave trade, planters were less inclined to entertain manumission since they rightly 
feared that they could no longer easily replenish their stock. 
55 Rawle Farley, Aspects of the Economic History of British Guiana 1781-1852 
(Unpublished Dissertation, University of London, 1952) 
56 Id. 
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In sum my argument is that across the islands, one might envision a 
continuum, with “loyalty” and “voice” being more likely in the 
smaller islands and “exit” being more likely in the larger islands. The 
larger the likelihood was of “exit,” the more quickly we are likely to 
witness the evolution of more fulsome robust property regimes in 
which law came to approximate longtime land practices.  
 
Not surprisingly, what happened with respect to property acquisition 
during slavery (when there were not formal protections) turns out to 
be singularly important. The irony is that the extensive nature of the 
provisioning system made it less likely that ex-slaves continued to 
remain in the employ of the masters once they had a choice. After all, 
they had already accumulated assets as slaves. Surely, more 
accumulation would be possible as proper free-holders. Why settle for 
the substitute “property-lite system” when one can have the real deal? 
 
Another conceptual framework that sheds perspective on the 
relationship between freeman and planters is the classic “hawk/dove” 
scenario. 57 To achieve their goal of ensuring consistent access to low-
cost labor, planters formed Associations (which looked like cartels) to 
pressure members not to sell lands to slaves. Moreover, in many 
islands the planter-controlled Colonial legislatures, introduced 
policies of restricting freedmen’s access to Crown (government) 
lands, essentially by pricing them out of the market.58 Additionally, 
the Colonial Governor (appointed in London, but typically close to the 
plantocracy) was typically empowered to raise the reserve price of 
Crown lands with little notice.59 Thus, if planters found themselves 
without access to consistent low-cost labor, the Colonial office would 
simply raise the price of land such that freedmen were no longer able 
to afford it. 
                   
 
57  The hawk-dove game is a coordination game in which players may adjust their 
expectations such that they converge on a focal point – again, a choice that is more salient 
than others. The name “Hawk/Dove” comes from a fictional game between two persons 
who drive their cars directly at each other. The driver who swerves first loses face. The 
failure of either to swerve will result in a certain crash. This is well described in McAdams, 
Richard. 2000. A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law. VA LAW REV., 86 (8), 1649-1729. 
58 Discussed infra 
59 Discussed infra 
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 Simultaneously, groups of freedmen, determined to secure their own 
land, pooled their resources and banded together to locate lands to 
purchase. In determining whether freedmen would have access to 
land, the interactions between the plantocracy and the Colonial 
legislature on one hand, and the freedmen on the other are Hawk/Dove 
games: neither wants to swerve first; nor do they want a crash. As it 
turns out, the planters swerved.  
 
Why did the planters swerve? To understand this we need some 
background on the political economy of the larger region, and its 
implication for planter power.60 As it turns out the planters’ power in 
the British Parliament and in the financial markets had been rapidly 
deteriorating. Moreover, the planter interests were divided. 
 
For the planters to tie the slaves to the plantations, they needed to 
maintain a united front.61 More specifically, they needed to ensure that 
there was no land for the slaves to buy. But there was no sense in a 
strategy of precluding slave access to Crown lands if there were 
financially strapped defectors within the planters’ associations who 
were willing to sell to slaves. Suffice it to say that within the 
plantocracy, defectors began to emerge. 62 Because many of the 
freedmen had cash, a minority of financially strapped planters rightly 
viewed the policy of restricting freedmen’s access to land as a case of 
‘shooting oneself in the foot.’63 Many of these minority planters 
proceeded to sell to the freedmen. 
 
Thus, freedman began to expand their holdings. They elected to leave 
their plantations, purchasing Crown lands when affordable; others 
purchased from white defectors. Regardless of the chosen method, 
these freedmen simultaneously started new lives and laid a foundation 
for the success of their descendants in property markets.  
 
IV. THE COUNTER-INTUITIVE NATURE OF MY ARGUMENT 
 
60 Discussed infra 
61 Discussed infra 
62 Discussed infra 
63 Discussed infra 
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In this section, I highlight aspects of the argument that are counter-
intuitive. The broader historical record provides plenty of evidence 
that the West Indies was hardly a propitious context for the 
development of a propertied black peasantry. There is good reason for 
plenty of skepticism that African laborers, former slaves, now 
freedmen, would be able to transition from “property-lite’’ to the “real 
deal.”  
  An important background to this section is the work of Daron 
Acemoglu and James Robinson: they are arguably the most important 
contributors to the literature emphasizing the primacy of countries’ 
colonially-bequeathed property rights as the driver of subsequent 
economic development.64 Acemoglu and Robinson are generally of 
the view that slave institutions once established, are extraordinary 
challenging to overturn, and are fundamentally inimical to the 
widespread availability of property rights in the long-term (even after 
slavery has been abolished). Once slave institutions are in place, it is 
difficult for a society to transition from what they term 
“extractiveness” to “inclusiveness.”  
 
By way of background, a distinguished body of academic work 
focuses on the correlation between a country’s institutions for the 
protection of property rights and the inclination of its citizens to 
accumulate assets.65  In wealthier countries, the median investor can 
rely on secure property rights and effective contract enforcement.66 In 
 
64 Simon Robinson is also a co-author on some of the articles. Acemoğlu et al, Root Causes: 
A Historical Approach to Accessing the Role of Institutions in Economic Development in G. 
SECONDI, THE ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT READER (2008) [“Root Causes”] 
65ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776); W. ARTHUR LEWIS, THE THEORY OF 
ECONOMIC GROWTH (1955); DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, 
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). 
66Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: 
An Empirical Investigation, 91 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 1369 (2001) [hereinafter, 
Acemoglu et al, “Origins”]; see also Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. OF 
POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta, Law and Finance]; Rafael La Porta, et al., 
The Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 285 (2008) [hereinafter La 
Porta, Legal Origins]; Paul Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek 
Might be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001); Richard Posner, Creating a Legal 
Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 1 (1998); 
Dam, Land, Law and Economic Development, J M Olin Law and Economics Working Paper 
472 (University of Chicago, 2006), Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development: 
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poorer countries, investors face the prospect of the arbitrary taking of 
property by either government or privileged elites, unconstrained by 
independent judges.    
A more modern body of work (anchored by Acemoglu) moves beyond 
correlation to causal claims by contending that countries where 
colonizers established strong property rights have experienced much 
higher levels of economic growth when compared with countries with 
different colonial trajectories.67 While a country’s colonial origin—
determined centuries ago—can hardly be said to “cause” its present-
day level of income; the nature of countries’ colonial origins enables 
researchers to estimate the causal impact of property rights on long-
run economic outcomes. 
I need to say a little more about Acemoglu and Robinson’s  argument 
to emphasize its relevance for the West Indies. European colonizers 
pursued widely different colonization strategies – with varied 
institutional frameworks.  Among non-European countries colonized 
by Europeans during the last five centuries, those that were initially 
richer are paradoxically poorer today. Acemoglu and Robinson 
theorize that in formerly rich countries with dense native populations 
or slave populations, Europeans introduced institutions, such as forced 
labor which drained the natives and/or slaves of their labor and wealth. 
These institutions are classically “extractive;”68 their primary goal was 
to facilitate the speedy transfer of wealth to the colonial powers. 69 
Understandably, the associated institutions neither protected the 
property rights of the median person, nor constrained elite power. 70  
 
Evidence From East Asia 34 Law and Society Review 829 (2000); Donald Clarke, 
Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis:  The China Problem, 51 J. OF COMP. 
LAW 89 (2002); Michael J. Trebilcock and Paul-Erik Veel, Property Rights and 
Development:  The Contingent Case for Formalization, Legal Research Series No. 08-10 
(Dec. 20, 2007); ROBERT D. COOTER AND HANS-BERND SCHAFER, SOLOMON’S KNOT:  HOW 
LAW CAN END THE POVERTY OF NATIONS (2011).  
67Acemoglu, Origins, supra note .  
68 Acemoğlu, Root Causes. Extractive institutions are defined in the following way, 
namely, those “designed to extract incomes and wealth from one subset of society 
[the median resident – my words] to benefit a different subset [the elite].” 
69 Acemoğlu, Root Causes.  
70 Acemoğlu, Root Causes  
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Extractive institutions lie on one end of the curriculum. In other 
colonies, another set of institutions prevailed. In colonies with only 
small native populations (such as New England and Australia), 
European settlers had little choice but to work hard themselves (i.e. 
there was no one to enslave – setting aside the very poor treatment of 
the indigenous populations, a clear omission in Acemoglu and 
Robinson).  For this reason, they developed institutional incentives 
rewarding work.  Thus, in contrast to extractive institutions, at the 
other end of the continuum, Europeans created what they term 
“inclusive” or “settler” societies, in which they reproduced European 
institutions for the protection of property.71    
What happened when the former colonies achieved independence? In 
some, they inherited the extractive institutions that coerced the 
common man to produce wealth for the governing elite. In others, they 
inherited settler institutions in which elites shared power and 
incentives for work were widespread. In sum: while extractive 
institutions are terrible for subsequent economic development, 
inclusive institutions are good. Herein, simply put, lies the difference 
between Bolivia and Massachusetts.  
As I briefly noted the institution of slavery is critical to their argument. 
They believe that once the institution of slavery was established in a 
colony, it was very difficult for a different system to take root. 72 
Acemoglu and Robinson offer a plethora of historical examples to 
make this point.  Their work is replete with former slave societies in 
which de jure slavery continues in a modified but essentially similar 
format (in which status relationships between the former slavers and 
 
71Daron Acemoglu, Why Not a Political Coase Theorem?  Social conflict, commitment 
and politics, 31 J. COMP.  ECON. 620 (2003) [hereinafter Acemoglu, Coase]. 
72 One rationale for the persistence of sub-optimal political institutions is discussed in 
Acemoglu’s article “Why not a Political Coase Theorem.” Here’s a precis:  
Do societies choose inefficient policies and institutions? An extension of the Coase theorem 
to politics would suggest the answer is no. This paper discusses various approaches to 
political economy and develops the argument that there are strong empirical and theoretical 
grounds for believing that inefficient policies and institutions are prevalent. We conclude 
that these inefficient institutions and policies are chosen because they serve the interests of 
politicians or social groups that hold political power at the expense of the rest. The 
theoretical case depends on commitment problems inherent in politics; parties holding 
political power cannot make commitments to bind their future actions because there is no 
outside agency with the coercive capacity to enforce such arrangements. 
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enslaved continue). One need only think of the post-Reconstruction 
emergence of Jim Crow, but there are so many other examples – in 
Cuba, Brazil and so forth. These are all classically extractive societies, 
well after the abolition of slavery.73  
 
The following paragraph encapsulates their argument well:  
The United States, which underwent a transformation similar to the 
English Glorious Revolution, had already developed its own brand of 
inclusive political and economic institutions by the end of the 
eighteenth century. . . . Australia followed a similar path to inclusive 
institutions . . . Not so in most of the other European colonies. Their 
dynamics would be quite the opposite of those in Australia and the 
United States. Lack of a native population or resources to be extracted 
made colonialism in Australia and the United States a very different 
sort of affair, even if their citizens had to fight hard for their political 
rights and for inclusive institutions. . . as in the many other places 
Europeans colonized . . . in the Caribbean . . . citizens had little chance 
of winning such a fight.  And there’s more. Much has been written by 
property scholars about the evolution of early property protections 
among the Puritan settlers in Massachusetts Bay, and the broader 
introduction of institutions for the protection of property rights of 
white settlers more broadly in the American colonies.74 Against this 
 
73 For a survey of the implications of extractive societies for the status of enslaved Africans 
in Latin America see FRANKLIN KNIGHT, THE AFRICAN DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICAN 
SOCIETIES (1974); COLIN PALMER, HUMAN CARGO: THE BRITISH SLAVE TRADE TO SPANISH 
AMERICA (1981) 
74 Acemoğlu, Coase.  Indeed, joining Acemoğlu and Robinson, property rights protection as 
a core value of the early American colonies and the early American Republic is also a 
central theme in the law review literature. See Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in 
the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273 (1991) (discussing the 
importance that the framers placed on the protection of small independent landholdings); 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 886–88 
(2000) (noting the elevated status of property as a constitutional matter from the earliest 
days of the Republic); Eduardo Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1890 
(2005) (noting that historically property rights have had “almost mythical status within 
American political thought”); Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: 
Alienability and Its Limits in American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 387–88 (2006) 
(noting the historical ties between early American views of the importance of broadly-based 
property rights and Republican political ideals). Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone 
Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 331–33 (1996) (noting that the framers considered 
property rights highly important in establishing a liberal constitutional order). But see 
7 Brown post Emancipation  6/23/2016  8:37 AM 
 
128  
background, it is interesting that Acemoglu specifically contrasts the 
strikingly differing institutions set up for the protection of property 
rights by the Puritans in New England (inclusive) and their Puritan 
“cousins” in Providence Island in the Caribbean (extractive):  
 
Thus, on the “settler . . . extractive continuum,” there has been little 
controversy as to where the West Indies should be grouped. Indeed, 
the West Indies, which “perfected” plantation slavery, were 
paradigmatic “extractive” societies, with minimal property protections 
embodied in law. 75  I would like to suggest an alternative narrative. I 
think that they have misplaced the British-colonized West Indies on 
their “extractiveness-inclusiveness” continuum, precisely because 
they misunderstand the widespread nature of property ownership 
achieved by former slaves in the aftermath of Emancipation.  
  
I emphasize that aspects of the argument are counter-intuitive. In one 
sense the argument that the West Indies was a favorable locale for the 
development of a black propertied class seems deeply odd.  Leaving 
aside Acemoglu and Robinson, the broader historical record provides 
plenty of evidence that the West Indies was hardly a propitious context 
for the development of a propertied black peasantry. In reviewing a 
broad range of typologies of slave societies, the sociologist of slavery 
Orlando Patterson has detailed the peculiarly cruel nature of West 
Indian slavery and the profound difficulties, even after Emancipation 
that freedmen experienced in asserting their personhood.76 Indeed, 
 
Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1991) (noting that 
despite the prioritization of property rights, much of early American real property was 
forcibly taken from Native Americans). 
75Engerman and Sokoloff, New World 1997, supra note ; see also Karen Ordahl 
Kupperman, England’s Dream of Caribbean Empire, in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN 
COLONIAL HISTORY (Karen Ordahl Kupperman ed., 2000).  
76ORLANDO PATTERSON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SLAVERY:  AN ANALYSIS OF THE ORIGINS, 
DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF NEGRO SLAVE SOCIETY IN JAMAICA 70-71 (1967) 
[hereinafter PATTERSON, SOCIOLOGY OF SLAVERY].; see also ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY 
AND SOCIAL DEATH:  A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1982) [hereinafter PATTERSON, SOCIAL 
DEATH]. For debates on the relative brutality of West Indian slavery, see B.W. HIGMAN, 
SLAVE POPULATIONS OF THE BRITISH CARIBBEAN, 1807-1834 (1984) [hereinafter HIGMAN, 
SLAVE POPULATIONS]; RICHARD SHERIDAN, DOCTORS AND SLAVES:  A MEDICAL AND 
DEMOGRAPHIC HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN THE BRITISH WEST INDIES, 1680-1834 (1985) 
[SHERIDAN, DOCTORS AND SLAVES]; HILARY BECKLES, NATURAL REBELS: A SOCIAL HISTORY 
OF ENSLAVED BLACK WOMEN IN BARBADOS (1989); Mintz & Hall, supra note ; GENERAL 
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West Indian slave society and its offspring institutions were legendary 
for their brutality.77 Some historians argue that this is why the West 
Indies was the place for “seasoning” or “breaking-in” slaves, who 
spent brief stints on West Indian plantations, en route to the Southern 
U.S.78 Moreover, irrespective of the customary arrangements that may 
have existed to support slave ownership of property, it remains 
undeniable that the West Indies does not have a strong historical 
heritage of formal property rights protections for African slaves. 79 At 
first glance, this would hardly be a promising context for the early 
emergence of a broad class of black property owners.  
 
By way of background, the following table highlights that for most of 
West Indian history, the islands were clearly extractive.80  
 
 
 
 
1) The beginnings of 
regional plantation slavery 
although minor in scope: 
The first sugar-cane 
plantations in the 
Caribbean, located on the 
Greater Antilles, ca. 1500-
1580, manned with enslaved 
CLEARY EXTRACTIVE 
 
HISTORY OF THE CARIBBEAN, VOL. III:  THE SLAVE SOCIETIES OF THE CARIBBEAN (Franklin W. 
Knight ed., 1997); and Jerome S. Handler & Arnold A. Sio, Barbados, in NEITHER SLAVE 
NOR FREE (David W. Cohen & Jack P. Greene eds., 1972).  
77A good summary of the peculiar brutality of West Indian slave institutions is in Knight 
and Liss’s collection. ATLANTIC PORT CITIES: ECONOMY, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY IN THE 
ATLANTIC WORLD, 1650-1850 (Franklin W. Knight & Peggy K. Liss eds., 1991). 
78SHERIDAN, DOCTORS AND SLAVES, supra note . 
79See Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) Report on Constraints to Growth and 
Development Strategies in the Caribbean (January 2010); Acemoglu, Root, supra note . 
80 By way of background, I have modified a table from the anthropologist of West Indian 
plantation society, Mintz. He schematizes Caribbean plantation society as falling into 
distinct periods.  In the table, I have taken Mintz’s typologies, and interposed on it, 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s continuum of extractiveness versus inclusiveness.    
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aborigines, and en- slaved 
and imported Africans 
2) The beginnings of the 
great expansion:  first 
British plantations in the 
Caribbean Lesser Antilles 
(e.g. Antigua, St. Vincent, 
Martinique, located in the 
Lesser Antilles, ca. 1640-
1670), manned with 
enslaved aborigines, 
European indentured 
servants, and enslaved 
Africans; 
CLEARLY EXTRACTIVE 
3) The great expansion: 
British plantations based 
exclusively on enslaved 
African labor, at their 
apogee in English Jamaica 
(post-1655) 
OVERWHELMINGLY 
EXTRACTIVE BUT WITH 
DEGREES OF SETTLERNEESS 
IN ENGLISH JAMAICA, 
GUYANA, TRINIDAD as 
evidenced by the beginnings of a 
black property-owning class 
4) Apprenticeship and 
Emancipation: plantations 
based on free and 
"contracted" (that is, 
indentured) labor, 
successively throughout the 
sugar colonies after 
Emancipation (post 1834-
1838, British.) 
MOVING TOWARDS GREATER 
SETTLERNESS IN THE BRITISH 
WEST INDIES, as evidenced by 
rapidly growing levels of property 
ownership among freedmen 
There is little disagreement regarding the classification of slave 
institutions. I am in agreement with Acemoglu and Robinson on Boxes 
1 and 2 in the above table.  Any potential disagreement is about 
degrees of “settlerness” with respect to the property owning slave 
population (Box 3), and the freedmen population in Apprenticeship 
and Emancipation (Box 4).  
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V. THE U.S. SOUTH 
To make the case that slave institutions are extremely hard to break, I 
will quickly switch my focus to the U.S. South. Acemoglu and 
Robinson argue that up until the 1960s, the U.S. consisted of two 
separate societies. They do not dispute that the Northern U.S. is 
properly classified as “settler.” 81 However, in their view, for most of 
its history the South was paradigmatically extractive.82  
 
While one might not contest their classification of Southern slave 
societies as extractive, Acemoglu and Robinson contend that even 
after the Civil War and Emancipation, the South remains firmly 
extractive, save for Reconstruction. Notwithstanding the passage of 
the Reconstruction Amendments, with the Fourteenth Amendment as 
its centerpiece and the ratification of these amendments by Southern 
states as a condition of regaining Congressional representation  (as 
well extensive supporting legislation passed by the Reconstruction 
Congress and state legislatures), I think few would dispute that the 
post Reconstruction backlash was extreme; or that the classic 
extractive characteristics of Southern plantation society were still on 
display. 83 These include the non-existence of institutions for the 
protection of the basic rights of the median Southern citizen (who in 
many southern states was typically a former slave or someone who 
was white and poor), including property and contract rights.84 For 
good reason, the iconic black scholar, W.E.B. Du Bois, wrote '[t]he 
slave went free; stood a brief moment in the sun; then moved back 
again toward slavery.'85 
 
 
81 Acemoglu, Coase, supra note .  
82 ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL at 351-57. 
83 ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL at 351-57 (citing ERIC FONER, 
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (2001); ERIC FONER,  A SHORT 
HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION (1990); W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN 
AMERICA (1999); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR (1995); 
JOSEPH RANNEY, IN THE WAKE OF SLAVERY: CIVIL WAR, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN LAW (2006))   
84 ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL at 351-57. 
85 ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL at 351-57. 
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For Acemoglu and Robinson, the critical period that confirms their 
“extractive” analysis is that there was minimal property ownership 
outside of the elite plantocracy. The key indication of the persistence 
of an extractive society even after Emancipation is the revocation of 
General Sherman’s Reconstruction-era promise to former slaves of 
“40 Acres and a mule.”  
 
That is, the former slaves might have had a fighting chance of building 
inclusive political institutions if they had been able to break the back 
of extractive economic institutions by setting up a propertied class, 
independent of the Southern white plantation elite. But without 
property, as Acemoglu and Robinson see it, they had no chance. As 
they write:  
 
“[T]here is more than one way of skinning a cat: as long as the planter 
elite was in control of its huge landholdings, and remained organized, 
it could structure a new set of institutions, Jim Crow instead of slavery 
to achieve the same objective. The vicious cycle turned out to be 
stronger than many, including Abraham Lincoln, had thought. The 
vicious cycle is based on extractive political institutions creating 
extractive economic institutions, which in turn support the extractive 
political institutions because economic wealth and power buy political 
power. When forty acres and a mule was off the table, the southern 
planter elite’s economic power remained untarnished.”86  
 
In Acemoglu and Robinson’s view, what was needed was a landed 
black peasantry – this was the only clear way to break the back of 
extractive political institutions.87   
 
I return to the West Indies . . . 
 
 
VI. THE WEST INDIES 
 
 
86 ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL, at 357. 
 
87 ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL at 414. 
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For Acemoglu and Robinson, the emergence of a black peasantry is 
essential. Again an understanding of the background political 
economy of the post- Emancipation sugar industry is important for 
assessing the prospects for the emergence of a black landowning class.  
 
Clear themes emerge in the literature on the political economy of the 
post-Emancipation period. They emphasize the increasing economic 
stress on sugar plantations who could no longer depend on protected 
access to the British market, as the “free trade” elements in the British 
Parliament gained traction for their efforts to import cheaper beet 
sugar from outside the British colonies. Their challenges were 
exacerbated by the importance of credit and increasing difficulty of 
obtaining credit from London bankers, alongside the increasing 
complexity of sugar production processes in light of declining soil 
quality.88 All of this was taking place against the background of the 
passage of the Apprenticeship Act to “apprentice” former slaves in the 
ways of freedom.89 The primary goal of this period governing the 
transition from slavery to freedom was to provide the plantocracy a 
period of adjustment in which they could utilize controlled (and 
cheaper) partly-free labor, prior to the full transition to free (and more 
expensive) labor.90  The transition to free labor ultimately occurred 
with the passage of the Emancipation Act in 1838.91 These factors all 
constitute an important background to the arguments presented here.   
 
A quick financial overview will give some sense of the significant 
impact of wage labor on the “cash flows” of already stressed 
plantations. A key feature of the West Indian plantation slave 
economy was, as one writer notes, “its extreme economy of working 
capital.”92 West Indian planters developed mechanisms of essentially 
running their operations with minimal cash flow. Slavery was very 
 
88 CURTIN, TWO JAMAICAS ,Chapters 6 and 9 (1995);  Lobdell,  Patterns of Investment and 
Sources of Credit in the British West Indian Sugar Industry 1838-1897, 4 JOURNAL OF 
CARIBBEAN HISTORY 31 (1972);   Hall, The Apprenticeship Period; Hall; HALL, FREE 
JAMAICA, 1838-1865, Chapters 2 to 3 (Yale, 1959); EISNER, JAMAICA: A STUDY IN 
ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1830-1930, Chapter 11 (1961) 
89 A good summary of the period leading up to the passage of the legislation is in Sherlock 
90 Id. 
91 Again, a good summary is in Sherlock 
92 Marshall, supra 
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important to running a near cash-less business, as was the provisioning 
system. As long as most of the slaves’ food came from the slaves’ own 
provision grounds, planters spent minimally on food.93 With respect 
to other purchases (machinery) etc., a key feature of the marketing of 
West Indian sugar was the utilization of consignee- agents.  Virtually 
every West Indian plantation relied on merchant-brokers in London to 
sell their sugar.94 These merchants were willing to purchase supplies 
for the plantations (on credit), as long as they were consigned the sugar 
crop. So purchases made in London would become accounting entries 
to be offset against the later-arriving sugar crop. Among historians 
who have done detailed examinations of the financial accounts of 
plantations, they often note how little cash the planters actually 
required.95 
Against a background of credit constraints, what was the planter 
facing a new regime of paid labor to do? The economist, Donald Harris 
argues that there were three possible strategies for a planter to 
pursue.96 The first would be to reduce the wage rate (although this 
strategy would be constrained by the lower acceptable boundaries of 
wages). The second would be to reduce the need for labor through 
innovation (new machinery, new agricultural techniques etc.) 
although this strategy would also be constrained since the planter, 
facing credit constraints, would likely have lacked access to the 
necessary capital. The third strategy would have been “to institute a 
system of tenancy rent on part of the available land alongside the 
system of wage labor on the rest of the land.”   
 
One popular iteration of this last strategy is sharecropping, a system 
of agriculture in which a landowner allows a tenant to use the land in 
return for a share of the crops produced on the land. Although now 
most widely associated with the U.S. South, it has a long historical 
heritage.97 Tenancy rent was attractive to the West Indian planter, for 
the same reason that it was attractive to the Southern planter in the 
 
93 Cumper, supra 
94 Marshall, supra 
95 Marshall, supra; Cumper, supra, Lobdell, supra. 
96 Harris, supra 
97 Paige, supra 
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U.S. – primarily as a mechanism of reducing cash outflows associated 
with labor. More particularly, as Harris notes a system of tenancy rent 
is particularly attractive for credit-constrained planters:  
 
“One obvious advantage of this strategy of combining rents and wages 
. . .  is that it allows the planter to cover some or all of the working 
capital advanced as wages from the current flow of rents paid by the 
tenants. In effect, what the planter pays out in one hand as wages to 
the workers is what he gets as rents in the other hand from the tenants. 
Thereby is resolved, at least partially, the cash flow problem of the 
planter. Or, more generally, the existence of tenancy rent reduces the 
net cash requirements that the planter must meet and, hence, the credit 
obligations that he must incur. The second advantage of this strategy 
of combining land tenancy and wage-labour is that it allows the 
workers (and/or their families) to grow their own food (directly or 
through exchange of products) on the plots of tenanted land and there 
by reduces the amount of cash the planter must advance as money 
wages to the workers. For this purpose, a system of sharecropping or 
of sharing labour service would do as well as a system of payment of 
rent (in cash or in kind). The third advantage of this arrangement, from 
the stand point of the individual planter, is that the planter is able to 
obtain an almost guaranteed access to a regular supply of labour 
through effectively tying the labour to his land through the granting of 
concessions and rights to the use of land by the family of the 
worker.”98 
 
It was precisely for these reasons that the system of sharecropping 
came to be widely utilized after Emancipation in the U.S. South. While 
share-contracting may have offered certain efficiencies to credit-
constrained planters,99 few would dispute Acemoglu and Robinson’s 
contention that the widespread nature of sharecropping in the U.S. 
South was a primary reason for the persistence of extractive 
institutions. These extractive institutions were ultimately inimical to 
 
98 Harris, supra 
99 Marshall (1920), Cheung (1969), Stiglitz (1974, 1988), Murrel (1983), Roumasset (1995), 
Allen and Leuck (2004), Hallagan (1978), Allen (1982), Muthoo (1998), Reid (1976), 
Eswaran and Kotwal (1985), Ghatak and Pandey (2000), Roy and Serfes (2001), Sen 
(2011), Shetty (1988), Basu (1992), Sengupta (1997), Ray and Singh (2001) 
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the enforcement of property rights (and ultimately the extension of 
voting rights) to freed Southern blacks.  
 
In the aftermath of Emancipation, the British plantocracy were 
initially no different than their counterparts in the Southern U.S: they 
were seeking to preserve their access to a low-cost labor force at all 
costs, and widespread independent land ownership for freed blacks 
was inimical to this goal. In a particularly stark iteration of a hawk-
dove game, there was vigorous attempt on the part of the plantocracy 
to institute systems of land tenancy. That their efforts were ultimately 
unsuccessful is due in large part for the fact that freedmen in the 
British West Indies were ultimately much more likely to become land-
owners than blacks in the Southern U.S. 
 
In the following sections, I discuss the post-Emancipation West Indian 
trajectory with a special focus on two different categories of colonies 
that further illustrate Hirschman’s conceptual ultimatum discussed 
earlier—exit/voice/loyality. The access that newly freedmen had to 
money and land abetted both voice and exit.  They were better able to 
bargain (“voice’) in part because their threats to exit were more 
credible. Moreover, when bargaining broke down, they had good 
options outside the plantation, facilitating exit. In some colonies 
(Jamaica and Guyana), “exit” became the default option. In other 
colonies, “voice” was the default option.  
 
A. GUYANA 
 
Despite its location in South America, the economy of British Guiana 
(henceforth referred to by its modern name, Guyana) was similar to 
the neighboring British West Indian islands. The major economic 
activity was sugar and its population was comprised primarily of black 
slaves. Its land mass is extraordinarily large but its interior (consisting 
of lands prone to flooding and forest) remained mostly unpopulated. 
Most of its sugar activity was concentrated on the Caribbean coastline 
plains – in proximity to several other British West Indian colonies. In 
the period before Emancipation, Guyana had been a reliable exporter 
of sugar and contributor to the British Treasury.  
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The economics literature is replete with situations in which land space 
exceeds the labor supply, and in such situations, labor typically seeks 
to establish itself independently on a peasant proprietorship basis.  The 
economic historian, Evsey Domar’s classic paper on serfdom in 
Russia is essentially a reflection on how serfdom evolved in the 15th 
century as a solution to the problem of labor-deprived Russian elites, 
who were seeking to secure labor where land was plentiful but labor 
was not.100 Domar contended that serfdom evolved as a mechanism of 
restricting the mobility of labor to ensure its availability to servitors 
(that is essentially an equivalent class to the English mesne Lords).  In 
the aftermath of Emancipation, the plantocracy in Guyana faced a 
similar problem to Russian elites – how to ensure a stable supply of 
labor. 
 
Indeed, Guyana was the West Indian colony that presented the 
problem in particularly stark terms. It was much smaller than Jamaica 
in terms of population; it had a population of only 100,000. Yet, in 
terms of land mass it was by far the largest British West Indian colony; 
it covered 85,000 square miles.   
 
While much of the terrain consisted of forests too forbidding for 
agricultural settlement,101 an economist would nevertheless recast this 
account as follows: in relative terms, the scarce factor of production 
was not land but labor; and owners could no longer depend on the 
ownership of labor. So to ensure consistent access to regular low-cost 
labor, the best strategy for the plantocracy was to decrease access of 
the newly freed slaves to land. One can imagine why for the planters 
this might have looked very much like a “zero sum” situation in which 
there could be only one winner – either the plantocracy or the former 
slaves. To the extent that there were alternative economic options for 
the freedmen, this would lead to a net reduction in available labor and 
correspondingly a net growth in the unit cost of their labor.  
 
For most of slavery, African slaves were only able to become 
largescale peasant proprietors in defiance of legal restrictions. This is 
how the first black farmers emerged in Guyana. Runaway slaves 
 
100 Domar, supra 
101 Indeed, significant proportions of the Amazon are found in Guyana.  
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(popularly known as “bush negroes”) set up large estates on which 
they grew ground provisions and rice away from the existing estates. 
Indeed, the first largescale rice farms in the entire Caribbean were 
managed by runaway slaves.102 However, under the then-prevailing 
pre-Emancipation legal framework, their actions were ultra vires. 
They had no permission to leave the plantation and they could not hold 
legal title.  
 
Post-Emancipation, the plantocracy now faced an entirely different 
legal context – land ownership for slaves was now legal. Consider 
again the Amelioration Act of 1825, a compromise Act that was 
passed in the British Parliament, when the famous abolitionist 
parliamentarian, William Wilberforce, failed in his efforts to achieve 
full Emancipation.103 The Amelioration Act permitted slaves who had 
accumulated sufficient cash reserves to buy their freedom.104 This was 
a landmark change: prior to the passage of the act, manumission had 
been largely the individual prerogative of a planter – it was not 
provided for in law.   
 
The agreement of the plantocracy to the passage of the Act was not 
coincidental: it was a recognition of the large amount of slave cash 
being kept under slave mattresses, and an attempt to facilitate planter 
access to this cash by bringing slave transactions into the formal 
system. Moreover, the Act permitted slaves to buy land, hold legal 
title, and open bank accounts. Indeed, slaves had sufficient cash at 
their disposal that, subsequent to the passage of the Act, a bank was 
established by the Colonial Office specifically for the slaves. Bottom 
line: having passed measures during slavery to bring slave transactions 
into the formal economy, the planters now had fewer legal tools at 
their disposal to ensure the availability of labor for their plantations.    
                      
Increasing the stakes was the fact that the slaves understood that the 
opportunities associated with independent farming were significant.  
The market for food was large. Moreover, the food market consisted 
 
102 Farley, supra 
103 There is a good summary on the background to the passage of this Act in Sherlock, 
supra. 
104 Appendix (to be added) 
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not only of the newly salaried black labor force, there were also export 
possibilities. Indeed, food produced by slaves (for their own accounts) 
had been exported between British West Indian colonies prior to 
Emancipation.   Moreover, while Africans operating within the 
constraints of the law, had been restricted to small scale plots, granted 
by the planters during the institution of slavery, and the necessarily 
limited proceeds of such plots, they were undoubtedly well aware that 
runaway slaves operating large-scale farms had achieved significant 
success. The planters quite rightly feared that large numbers of their 
workforce would follow their runaway predecessors by seeking to 
operate larger farms in “free villages.”  
 
One need only consider a report written for the Colonial Office by 
Commander Charles Edmondson, who in the period immediately 
preceding Emancipation commanded a regiment patrolling for 
runaway slaves. The Commander underlined the agricultural (and 
implicitly financial) success of runaway slaves:  
 
The quantity of rice the Bush Negroes have just rising out of the 
ground is very considerable, independent of yams, tannias, plantains, 
tobacco, etc., and as it will be three months before the rice is fit to 
gather in, I would recommend at that period another expedition to be 
sent and destroy the same.105 
 
He further noted:  
 
It devolved on Major Brandt and Mr. Avery to destroy all the 
provisions that could be met with. This they did most effectually, 
fourteen houses filled with rice and several fields in cultivation being 
by their exertions totally destroyed ... I take upon me to say from these 
gentlemen's report that on a moderate calculation the quantity of rice 
that has been destroyed by them (independent of ground provisions) 
would have been equal to the support of seven hundred Negroes for 
twelve months.106 
  
 
105 Colonial Office report (1836) 
106 Id. 
 
7 Brown post Emancipation  6/23/2016  8:37 AM 
 
140  
Not all of these ground provisions were being consumed by runaway 
slaves. It is more likely that there was a black market (presumably 
involving slaves still resident on the plantations) that channeled these 
provisions into both internal markets and external export markets.  
Thus, in addition to the cash reserves acquired through the 
provisioning system, some slaves are likely to have accumulated 
further cash by facilitating “black market” access for the provisions of 
runaway slaves.  
                    
In sum, the plantocracy lacked the tool of de jure prohibition of land-
purchase. Slaves were already formally admitted to the property 
markets and the beginnings of rudimentary financial intermediation 
for slaves was already in play. Thus to prevent widespread 
landholding among freedmen, they needed to find more subtle 
methods.  
                    
To achieve their goal of ensuring consistent access to low-cost labor, 
the planter-controlled Colonial legislature introduced a policy of 
restricting freedmen’s access to Crown lands by pricing them out of 
the market.107 The policy dictated that Crown lands would be sold at 
public auction at a reserve price of one pound per acre. Moreover, the 
Crown would never sell less than 100 acres. 108 Thus, freedmen could 
not purchase Crown lands unless they had at least 100 pounds – a 
pricey sum even for frugal freedmen (a successful freedman might 
have netted 20 pounds a year from provisioning during slavery).   
 
Additionally, the Colonial office was empowered to raise the reserve 
price of Crown lands further. 109 Thus, if planters found themselves 
without access to consistent low-cost labor, the Colonial office would 
simply raise the price of land to reduce affordability. Moreover, the 
penalties for squatting on Crown lands were increased significantly. 
                   
You will recall that I earlier argued that if we conceptualize the face-
off between the planters and the slave population as a “hawk/dove,” 
game, the planters swerved first. Why did the planters swerve? Thirty 
 
107 Farley, supra 
108 Farley, supra 
109 Farley, supra 
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years earlier, when plantation interests were at the pinnacle of their 
power (and able to stave off abolitionists for several decades), there is 
little doubt that the planters could have tied the former slaves to the 
plantations. They had multiple mechanisms at their disposal – all of 
which were tried and eventually failed in the West Indies. Indeed, the 
mechanisms for tying slaves to plantations in other former slave 
plantation economies are well articulated in the historical literature.110  
 
 
For the planters to tie the slaves to the plantations, they needed to 
maintain a united front. More specifically, they needed to ensure that 
there was no land for the slaves to buy. But there was no sense in a 
strategy of essentially precluding slave access to Crown lands if there 
were defectors. This is where the planter strategy broke down.  
Because many freedmen had cash, a minority of planters rightly 
viewed the policy of restricting freedmen’s access to land as 
foolhardy. They accepted that the heyday of sugar was over. Sensible 
planters should be cashing out before bankrupting themselves, not 
choking off potential buyers. In the freedmen they saw potential 
buyers of their soon-to-be-defunct plantations. 
  
Thus, there emerged two groups of planters. One group that refused to 
sell to former slaves, and sought to influence policy to price Crown 
lands out of their reach. A second group saw in the freedmen a 
 
110 Mintz has a wonderful comparative paper which discusses strategies used to tie freedmen 
to the plantations. For example, in the U.S. South, significant numbers of freedmen found 
themselves indebted sharecroppers, forever in ‘debt’ to their former owners, with minimal 
prospects of liquidating their debts and exiting the plantation economies. Similar strategies 
were utilized by the planter class in the larger Hispanico-Caribbean region (including Cuba 
and Puerto Rico). In South America (primarily Brazil), former slaves later found themselves 
transformed into “indentured laborers.” Like African-American sharecroppers, they were 
forever in debt to their former masters, but rather than seeking to liquidate debts through 
tenancy and crop-sharing arrangements, they paid off debts largely through labor – again, 
largely an exercise in futility. In all of these circumstances, the ‘”status” relationships that 
had been prevalent during slavery continued to prevail. There is good reason for Acemoglu 
and Robinson’s previously mentioned skepticism that institutions based on ‘status’ 
relationships (namely plantation slavery and the supporting background organizational 
framework) would easily transform into institutions based on respect for the property and 
contract. Overwhelmingly, the historical evidence is on their side.  
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welcome source of scarce cash, to whom they could off-load their 
failing plantations. This second group ultimately defected. 
 
Which planters were brave enough to defect? The record reflects that 
a minority of planters sought to convince the Colonial Governor that 
choking off slave access to land was an exercise in futility. Take for 
example the cotton plantocracy in Guyana.111  Cotton had also been a 
staple export product, but the cotton tariffs had been removed before 
the sugar tariffs - they found themselves unable to compete with the 
lower-cost American cotton flooding the British market. During the 
period of Apprenticeship and Emancipation, the cotton plantations, 
long poorly capitalized, buckled more quickly than the sugar 
plantations. The cotton plantocracy expended significant energies 
trying to influence the Colonial governor to bless their plan to sell 
freedmen land. When they failed in the political marketplace, they 
proceeded to exercise their rights as sellers in the regular marketplace.  
 
Moreover, the first group of planters who refused to sell to former 
slaves made another strategic error. That cotton planters were 
defecting was not a secret: after all, former slaves were leaving the 
plantation in droves. Once they realized that the planter class was not 
maintaining a united front, they should have offered estate lands not 
currently under sugar cultivation to the slaves. In so doing, they would 
have had a fighting chance of keeping the former slaves close to the 
plantation and increased the likelihood that they would later be 
available for paid work.112   
 
This was recognized by one absentee planter and English Member of 
Parliament, Henry Barkly, who implicitly criticized his fellow planters 
for their strategic error in testimony to a parliamentary committee on 
sugar and coffee.113 He knew the Guyanese economy well, not only 
 
111 Moohr, supra 
112 Ultimately the challenges of staffing the plantations were only mitigated through 
immigration of indentured laborers largely from India, but also from Java, China and West 
Africa. Moohr, supra 
113 Report (Committee of 1842). See similar sentiments expressed by another planter Mr. 
Innes, in The Sugar Question, Vol. 2 and Mr. Hankey in the Third Report (Committee of 
1848) 
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was he a plantation owner, he was a banker of sorts who provided 
mortgages to fellow planters and credit when merchants would not 
extend it.114  
 
He felt that the planters’ fears about the imminent loss of labor to the 
interior were entirely overwrought. 115 For one, the primary industry 
in the interior was logging. While there were newly prosperous 
freedmen who had joined the logging industry and were operating 
their own sawmills, logging was a hard life. 116 It was much more 
likely he felt that most freedmen would prefer cultivation on the 
coastal planes, an occupation and an area, with which they had long 
been familiar. 117 In his words, the freedmen now had “"too many 
wants and too luxurious habits to live in the bush." 118  He noted that 
the freedmen had generally not remained on their previous estates, 
"except where land was sold to them immediately after Emancipation 
by the proprietors." 119  
 
In Barkly’s view, this was largely the consequence of the stubbornness 
of those members of the planter class who refused to accept that 
freedmen’s land ownership was inevitable. 120 Rather than seeking to 
fight the inevitable labor loss, he felt that the sugar plantation owners 
should have taken a different course, namely, try to “cultivate” the 
freedmen and provide incentives for them to remain close to the 
plantations. 121 He felt that land at the edge of the plantations (much of 
which had already been allocated during slavery as provision grounds) 
should have been offered liberally to the newly freedmen, as an 
incentive for them to remain close to their former estates. 122  
 
Barkly admired the practicality of the cotton plantocracy in Guyana, 
who would rather take the “black” money of freedmen, than face 
 
114 Report (Committee of 1842) 
115 Report (Committee of 1842) 
116 Report (Committee of 1842) 
117 Report (Committee of 1842) 
118 The Sugar Question, Vol. 2 
119 Report (Committee of 1842) 
120 Report (Committee of 1842) 
121 Report (Committee of 1842) 
122 Report (Committee of 1842) 
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bankruptcy and debtor’s prison. 123  Too many proprietors refused to 
sell estate land to freedmen since in Barkly’s words "they thought it 
would render the Negroes too independent of them. They therefore 
refused to sell, and the Negroes bought abandoned estates and land 
elsewhere and removed from the estates." 124 When they finally came 
to their senses and were willing to sell to the freedmen, it was too late 
– too many plantations had gone bankrupt and cheap land was 
abundant. Indeed, within a decade of Emancipation, more than 20 
percent of former slaves had joined free villages constituted largely (if 
not entirely) of now defunct former plantations owned by the English 
plantocracy.  Moreover, Barkly was right in another sense: the 
overwhelming majority of freedmen did not settle far from the 
plantations, even if their former masters had generally refused to sell 
to them.125  Like the English, they settled primarily on the rich flat 
alluvial Caribbean coastlines.126  
 
Indeed, it was in taking over defunct plantations that we find the 
beginning of the freedmen’s movement.127  For example, in late 1839, 
a group of laborers combined their resources to purchase the 
abandoned Plantation Northbrook.128 A sub-group of the laborers were 
elected to be title-holders who held the land in trust, with the land then 
being sub-divided to individual laborers in proportion to their 
contribution to the purchase price.  One commentator noting the land 
acquisition practices of the Guyanese freedmen wrote of "the wisdom 
and initiative displayed in the acquirement of property from the early 
years of their freedom."129  Moreover, those who did not have the cash 
“up front” were even financed by more cash-rich slaves, through 
quasi-formal financial intermediation, namely friendly societies.130 
One writer, Norman Cameron notes “societies for the mutual benefit 
 
123 Report (Committee of 1842) 
124 Report (Committee of 1842) 
125 Root, supra 
126 Beachey, supra 
127 Farley, supra 
128 Farley, supra 
129 Norman Cameron, The Evolution of the Negro, supra 
130 Cameron. The roll-out of friendly societies in the West Indies were analogous to the 
well-known highly successful expansion of credit unions in Germany by Raiffeissen, the 
modern cooperative banking movement. 
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which were operating with a certain degree of secrecy in slavery times 
began to rear their heads.”131  
  
The new freedmen owners of the aforementioned Northbrook resolved 
to grow sugarcane. Their initial goals were essentially to grow goods 
for the export markets – while organizing themselves as a democratic 
cooperative. Each land-holder would grow sugar cane, and then they 
would market cooperatively. The cooperative model applied more 
broadly: for example, communal ground-works (draining, roads etc.) 
were supervised by an elected committee with each title-holder 
contributing labor to completion of the works.      
 
Commenting on the practice of freedmen purchasing and subdividing 
estates one contemporaneous observer, Milliroux writes: 
 
 "Thus in 1840, the freed slaves, those so-called outlaws, set 
themselves peacefully to purchase land in parts of the colony nearest 
to large cultivations. Sedentary and industrious habits could be 
acquired even in the bosom of slavery. Twenty-five to fifty heads of 
families united and put their savings together. The sum reached ten, 
thirty, and nearly eighty thousand dollars .... they paid the whole or a 
large part of the price in cash and became proprietors of a property 
which they worked in shares or which they sub-divided into distinct 
lots"132  
 
Given that freedmen were creative in achieving their goals, planter 
mechanisms of constraining the free village movement also became 
more creative. For example one ordinance stipulated that collectively 
bought land could be purchased by no more than 20 persons.133 
Another ordinance stipulated that if more than ten persons purchased 
an estate it would be subject to partitioning, with each parcel being 
subject to compulsory taxes to be paid to the local government on a 
monthly basis.134  
 
131 Cameron, supra 
132 Quoted in Farley, supra 
133Farley, supra 
134 Farley, supra 
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Yet ultimately, the plantocracy seeking to tie labor to sugar estates 
proved no match for the forces of the market – estate owners seeking 
to cash out and freedmen seeking to buy. The efforts of the hold-outs 
were rendered even more futile by the emergence of a class of 
enterprising middle-men, namely broker-entrepreneurs among former 
slaves – they sought out planters on the verge of bankruptcy and 
brokered deals with slaves who were willing to buy. For example, one 
of the better known brokers, Cudjoe McPherson bought several 
plantations at what were perceived to be knockdown prices, 
subdivided them and sold lots to his fellow freedmen at a profit. Many 
missionaries also served as trustees buying land in trust for former 
slaves. Missionaries also encouraged slave access to financial 
intermediation. Indeed, the Wesleyan Benevolent society started in 
Guyana by missionaries, remains legendary in the Caribbean as a fast-
growing “friendly society” (analogous to a credit union) which 
provided financial intermediation and was popular with former slaves. 
 
A good measure of the rapidity of the spread of land ownership comes 
from the property tax rolls in one Guyanese county, Berbice, 
immediately preceding and shortly after Emancipation. As of the date 
of Emancipation, August 1, 1838, there were 20,000 persons in the 
county (that is, twenty percent of the overall population of the county). 
135 Fully 15,000 of these persons were former slaves, not one of whom 
were legal title holders (as opposed to being de-facto owners of 
property).136 Four years later, in 1842, of the 2,942 freehold properties, 
containing 3,017 families and 14,127 persons, fully 1,223 families, 
comprising 4,646 individuals were freedmen.137   
 
Across the entire country, as of the end of 1848, freedmen had 
acquired no less than 446 estates. 138 They had built 10,541 houses, 
which were occupied by 44,443 persons. This in a population of 
100,000, in which 89,000 were former slaves or descendants of former 
slaves. Thus, only a decade Emancipation more than half of the 
 
135 Farley, supra 
136 Eisner, supra 
137 Eisner, supra 
138 Farley, supra 
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freedmen were living on freehold property! 139  It is little wonder that 
a somewhat exuberant planter-historian writing in 1858 declared the 
following of the newly property former slaves:  "They present the 
singular spectacle to be witnessed in no other part of the world, and of 
which history affords no parallel, of a people just emerged from 
slavery, now enjoying property in houses and lands, for which they 
have paid no less than a million of money."140 
 
 
B.  JAMAICA 
 
In Jamaica, the themes are striking in their similarity to the Guyanese 
situation: the vindictiveness of a significant proportion of the planter 
class refusing to sell marginal estate land to former slaves, the 
enterprising nature of other planters, who recognized an opportunity 
to liquidate unprofitable plantation holdings before their creditors got 
the better of them, bluffing on the part of the planter-dominated 
Colonial legislature who sought to deny freedmen access to Crown 
lands, iterations of hawk-dove games in which the planters swerved 
first, the setting up of freedmen’s villages often on formerly 
abandoned estates, and the rapid growth in the level of freehold 
ownership in a short time. 
In Jamaica, the planter strategy to hold slaves to the plantations 
collapsed even more quickly than in Guyana. A major turning point 
was the widespread collapse of the local banking sector (driven in part 
by the refusal of London banks to continue to underwrite Jamaican 
banks). With the final calling of long-standing debts, a significant 
number of plantations were put on the auction block in several 
territories.141 Again, the primary buyers were freedmen.142 
Nowhere was it clearer that the success of the provisioning system 
during slavery was foundational to the slaves’ land-acquisition 
strategy than Jamaica. On the eve of Emancipation, Jamaican slaves 
were cash rich – one estimate was that they were in control of close to 
 
139 Farley, supra 
140 Quoted in Farley, supra 
141 Lobdell, supra 
142 D.G. Hall, supra 
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50% of the cash in circulation in the island. 143 In Jamaica, the free 
village movement – operating on a similar model to Guyana, with 
slaves pooling resources to buy out fleeing estate owners – proved 
very popular. Within four years of Emancipation, nearly 15% of the 
formerly enslaved population were independent farm owners on 
abandoned estates.144 
 
Size of the Population Living in Villages Built since Emancipation 
in 1838, selected Dates, 1842-51 
Source: Calculated from data contained in Adamson, op. cit. Table 
1, p. 16. 
Date Numbers Date Numbers 
November 
1842 
15,906 June 1849 40,038 
December 
1844 
18,511 December 
1849 
41,303 
June 1847 29,000 December 
1850 
42,755 
December 
1848 
44,443 June 1851 46,368 
The model was usually the same as the aforementioned Guyanese 
model – resources were pooled, land was bought in trust by an elected 
committee, with the land then being subdivided for proportional 
allocation to individual freedmen according to their contribution to the 
purchase price.  
 
To the extent that the freedmen tried to grow sugar and cotton for the 
export market they met the same fate as their forebears in the 
plantocracy – they were capital constrained, and their likelihood of 
success was rendered even more minimal by their cooperative 
organization. They had to not only grow sugar cane, but to coordinate 
the complex processes needed to turn cane into sugar among many 
independent people – cutting, grinding, the operation of factories, and 
so forth. Those cooperatives that abandoned export goods such as 
 
143 Farley, supra 
144 Hall, supra 
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sugar, choosing instead to produce ground provisions (yams, cocoas 
etc.) for internal consumption (with lesser amounts being exported) 
did much better. For with these crops, the capital requirements were 
much more modest and the cooperative tasks were less demanding – 
there was no need, for example, for cooperative factory work.  
 
In the end, there were mixed models of land-ownership. First, some 
freedmen remained in cooperatives. Second, some abandoned the 
cooperative approach becoming independent peasant farmers. And 
third, some pursued an approach of mixed wage labor (as workers on 
the plantations where they were formerly enslaved) and independent 
farming.   
 
Yet even those who continued to do plantation work were able to 
bargain for increased wages, due to the scarcity of labor and were 
widely believed to be utilizing the proceeds of their labor to 
supplement sums saved so that they could purchase more land. As one 
magistrate wrote of laborers in his county: “[T]he labourers . . .evince 
a great desire and are making great efforts to become small 
freeholders; half-an-acre of land amply gratifies their wants and this 
quantity they can usually purchase in good situations for from 70 to 
100 dollars, or, in other words, by the saving of six or nine months' 
industry."145 
 
The Jamaican macroeonomic data for the relevant period bears out 
these themes. On the eve of Emancipation, slaves accounted for 27% 
of agricultural exports. 146 Yet in 1852 (fourteen years after 
Emancipation), the slaves accounted for 43% of agricultural 
exports.147 Moreover, their contribution to the larger economy 
(percentage of GDP) had also increased significantly.148 
 
 
C. BARBADOS AND THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN 
 
 
145 Quoted in Hall, supra. 
146 Eisner, supra 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
7 Brown post Emancipation  6/23/2016  8:37 AM 
 
150  
The first thing to underline about Barbados, St. Kitts, St. Vincent and 
nearby Eastern Caribbean islands are their small size. Land was 
extraordinarily scarce. In Barbados, for example, on the eve of 
Emancipation, 100,000 people occupied between 80,000 and 100,000 
acres of land (that is less than an acre per person).149 Moreover, the 
plantocracy had a monopoly on land. One showed that 441 of 508 
estates controlled 81% of the total land.150 Additionally, there were 
virtually no Crown lands available. Thus, the following reflections of 
a local Magistrate shortly after Emancipation are unsurprising:  
 
Little progress has been made by the laborers in establishing 
themselves as freeholders, not from any disinclination on their part to 
become so, but, circumscribed as our island is, there is little 
probability of any great number being able to obtain freeholds. The 
reason is obvious; there is not in the whole island a spot of waste land 
fit for cultivation; and as the land is principally divided into 
plantations, the proprietors are not likely to sell off small plots for that 
purpose; and there being no public lands available, it is plain that 
freeholders to any extent cannot be established in this country.151 
 
Unsurprisingly, during the institution of slavery, the provisioning 
system was far less extensive in these islands – rather than receiving 
fulsome plots, slaves instead cultivated “garden plots.”  
 
Nevertheless, despite these conditions, some slaves accumulated 
assets and a small group of free holders were able to establish 
themselves in all of the islands. Where they existed, the free villages 
showed political potential. Constituencies were small, and thus, their 
influence was significant despite their small numbers. Indeed, in 1849 
in Barbados, one free village is believed to have determined the 
outcome of a closely fought general election (for the local Colonial 
legislature)152 
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On the whole, however, slaves focused their efforts less on land 
acquisition in free villages, than on banding together to bargain 
collectively with planters. Their efforts led to significant changes in 
the organization of labor on the estates. For example, on several 
estates, women and children were largely removed from field labor, 
with some women working half-days to allow them to attend to their 
homes and children. In St. Vincent, women sought relief from field 
labor on Fridays to allow them to prepare for Saturday market.153 
Moreover, the wages received for paid time (as opposed to “slave” 
time) during Apprenticeship set a benchmark below which they would 
not fall in wage bargaining. 154  
 
The planters sought long-term contracts, low wages and conditional 
occupancy of houses and gardens on the estate (conditioned on 
working a certain number of hours on the plantation). 155 In yet another 
face-off between the planters and freedmen, the planters bargained 
that the freedmen would recognize that the houses and garden plots 
belonged to the planters, that they did not have tenancy rights, but that 
their continued occupancy of these houses and gardens was 
conditioned on employment. 156 Moreover, some planters reserved the 
right to charge rent (typically implied rental rates were deducted from 
wages). 157 On some plantations, the freedmen faced the very real 
possibilities of eviction if they did not yield.  
 
In many of the islands, planters who sought to evict faced strikes, 
sometimes lasting for several weeks. Many freedmen refused orders 
to vacate their houses and gardens, with some insisting that “the Queen 
had granted them the homes and gardens.”158 Having faced violent 
resistance in the face of some attempted evictions, a general consensus 
emerged among the planters that it would be deeply unwise to proceed 
with evictions. And thus evolved what one writer terms “a fragile 
industrial peace.” 159   
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Over time, marginal plantation lands became available to some 
freedmen, albeit for high rents. Even the system that evolved of 
“tenantry” was controversial among the planters.  While some planters 
welcomed the opportunity to generate revenue from marginal lands, 
others warned of the “evil effects” of tenants becoming “small 
farmers” for the larger Barbadian society. 160 They were deeply 
ambivalent about slaves accumulating cash outside of the plantations, 
with one planter group deeming the practice “at variance with all 
rational views of a prosperous country” and urging the continued 
“concentration of capital and labour.” 161 In summary, with so many 
freedmen tied to the plantations, “voice” emerged as the major 
strategy in these smaller islands. There were however “exit” 
opportunities; the major “out” was emigration. As Woodville Marshall 
writes “those ex-slaves who wanted to "better" themselves away from 
the estates had to think of emigration.162 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The root of the failure of West Indian planters to tie slaves to the 
plantations lay in the cash reserves that West Indian freedmen 
accumulated as slave provisioners. These slaves wanted to become 
freeholders. Faced with a choice between farming their own land 
(even if the land was marginal) and sharecropping, overwhelmingly 
they chose to become freeholders.  
 
The irony is that the extensive nature of the provisioning system 
(which acculturated slaves in a form of “property-and-contract-lite”) 
made it less likely that ex-slaves continued to remain in the employ of 
the masters once they had a real choice. It made it more likely that they 
would have money to buy their own land and become de jure property 
owners and contractors.  In the larger islands, in which land was 
plentiful, this choice predominated; in the smaller islands the 
freedmen were more constrained. The larger the likelihood was of 
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slave “exit,” from plantations, the more likely we are to witness a 
quick and full transition of former slaves to freeholders. 
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